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INTRODUCTION OF THE PROBLEM AND
JUSTIFICATION FOR RESEARCH

Water is among the most abundant of all materials known to
man. In all its various forms, water covers 75 percent of the earth's
surface . It is estimated that the total physical quantity of water on the
earth is 326, 000, 000 cubic miles (14).

This apparent abundance belies

the true nature of the water resource as it relates to the needs of man.
At any given point in time, only a rather minute portion of this vast
quantity of water is found in those forms and locations which render it
useful to man. This may be attributed to the fact that uti.li.ty in water is
perishable and the efforts of man to amend the hydrological cycle have
been successful only to a limited extent (1).
Presently, expanded economic activity coupled with population
increases threaten to exhaust the economic supply in some areas. This
is especially true in some major urban centers and in the arid western
United States . If current projections concerning population and water
use patterns materialize in the future, human ingenuity will do well to
keep pace with burgeoning demand.
Water is not a single use resource. Uses range from the aesthetic
such as the fountain which enhances the beauty of a park, to the common,
such as irrigation and the dilution of sewage. Quantity, quality, and
location of water is often such that it may be used by any one of a
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multiplicity of uses or users. When water is scarce, this gives rise to
competition within and among uses such as agriculture, manufacturing,
and domestic consumption. This is not to say that all uses are competitive. Water stored in a reservoir for irrigation may also be used
for recreation or to generate hydro-electric power without reducing
the quantity available for irrigation. The relationship here is supplementary and perhaps even complementary . However, an allocation
problem does exist any time supply is insufficient to satiate demand
and uses are competitive (10, p. 34-36).
Future resource availability for any use or user is dependent upon
one or both of two areas of activity (10, p. 32) . The first involves
augmentation of the usable physical supply by effecting greater control
of the hydrological cycle. Examples of this include such activities as
converting sea water, seeding clouds, tapping glacier ice; and more
commonly, watershed management, reservoir construction, canal
lining, use of underground storage, and adaptation of more efficient
application methods.
The second area of activity involves the allocative machinery
which determines the disposition of both existing and potential supplies.
In Utah and throughout the United States, these are composed of a

heterogeneous accumulation of institutions, given credence by formal
law and community mores . The term institution is used here in the
broader sense of an established practice, law or custom, which is
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usually, but not always, represented by some formal organization.
These institutions vary greatly in organization and function, but in
certain respects their influence on the allocation of water among
competing uses and users appears to be a critical factor in determining
what benefit society may obtain from a limited quantity of water.
Any statement concerning the relative merits of the development
of new supplies versus refinement or abandonment of some of the present
allocative machinery as a means of meeting the increasing demand for
water is subject to conjecture. Both alternatives merit consideration,
and they are interrelated. In this study, water institutions received
primary focus.
A multiplicity of methods could be used to effect a different
allocation of water among competing uses . They could be expected to
run the entire gamut from seizure and distribution by an unquestioned
authority to laissez-faire. The one extreme seems to imply that a
supposed omnipotent person, bureau, agency, etc., has unassailable
l<.nowledge and author ity whi.ch allows it to effect the best allocation
for society. The other extreme suggests that society is best served
when each individual with an interest in water is allowed to make and
effect his own decisions. It should be obvious that neither extreme can
be entirely applicable .
Much of the current literature tends to support schemes approaching
the more authoritative methods of allocation. These are modified in some
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instances by reservations with respect to compensation for loss of rights
and a limitation to specific uses.

A limited amount of support can be

found for a more laissez-faire approach to water allocation . These are
tempered by a recognition of the need for institutions which insure
property rights and provide for flexibility in control of the resource.
With few exceptions there is a surprising lack of empirical evidence to
support a general movement toward either approach.
Decisions made by legislators, administrators, policy-makers,
etc., at various times in the past have suffered from lack of sufficient
evidence pertaining to the alternatives at hand. This study was an
attempt to provide some enlightenment in the area of water allocation
by evaluating the efficiency implications associated with a removal of
selected transfer restrictions affecting irrigation water.

OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
In

utah, water allocation is subject to administrative mani-

pulation under the appropriative doctrine of water law. Because it is
an economic necessity, flexibility in the control of water is probably
as great as it is in any other state. Many decisions of the administrative
agencies have allowed increased flexibility and more efficient utilization
of existing supplies (25). Evidences of narket allocation can be found
throughout the state. Even so, certain influences are present in the
institutions pertinent to water which restrict free transfer and might
possibly effect a misallocation of the resource.
No attempt was made in this study to identify and explore the
ramifications of all possible impediments to transfer which may result
from the influence of institutional factors. Rather, this study was an
attempt to determine if market allocations of water under conditions of
comparatively free transfer conditions were more efficient, in the
economic sense, than allocation by administrative rules and legal rights.
Objectives
Specific objectives of the study were as follows :
1. To describe the water market,

2. To determine the market values placed on the rights to water
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within a given use,
3. T o identify selected changes in the institutional fac tors
pertinent to water which restrict free transfer of water, and to determine
how critical the y are in misallocation.
The first two objectives were prelimina ry steps t oward the
accomplishment of the third and primary objective of the study.
The first objective, to describe the water market, was accomplished
by summarizing the data supplied by persons familiar with market practices
found in the study area, giving special emphasis to the development,
operation, and flexibility of the water rental market.
The second objective, to determine the values placed on the rights
to water within a given use, was accomplished by capitalizing the average
annua l rental price at an "appropriate" rate of interest. In an effort
to simulate uncertainties found in the real world, an expectation model
was incorporated into these calculations.
In order to accomplish the third objective, it was necessary to

identify policy changes affecting the study area which a priori. would
have influenced flexi.bi.li.ty. In addition, it was necessary to find a
measure of value which would yield some indication of the relative
efficiency of allocation before and after such changes in the institutional
factors. The annual rental price of water (real terms) was deemed most
appropriate for this purpos e .
Reliability of the measures used in this analysis was determined
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by applying various tests of significance. The three statistical
techniques employed were a multiple regression analysis, a test of
the difference between means, and a co-variance analysis. The two
latter techniques were somewhat repetitious, but served to confirm
each other.
The extent or cost of misallocation for the area was determined
by capitalizing the differential in rental price occurring between alternative
allocative arrangements.

SOURCES OF DATA
Accurate historical data concerning market allocation of water
were considered vital to the success of this endeavor. For this reason,
the geographic scope of this study was limited to the Delta area in Utah
where data of this nature were available.
Both primary and secondary sources of data were utilized.
The principal primary sources included the records of the following:
irrigation companies on both upper and lower Sevier River, the Millard
County Assessor, the Millard County Recorder, the Millard County Soil
Conservation Office, the Delta Farmers Home Administration Office,
and the Office of the State Engineer. Other primary data were acquired
by personal interview with farmers, irrigation company officers, river
commissioners, bankers and lawyers who were familiar with the problems
pertinent to this study.
The secondary sources included publications dealing with soil,
climate, agricultural production, prices, irrigation and historical
features of the study area. Included among these were several bulletins
and articles published by the Utah State Agricultural Experiment Station,
the United States Department of Agriculture, and the United States
Department of Labor.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE
A review of all the literature pertinent to water resources would
be a very formidable task. In keeping with the objectives of the study,
this review has been limited to a few carefully selected publications which
are concerned with allocative efficiency.
Hirshleifer, et al. (10, p. 32-73) present a very lucid description
of water supply and give an application of economic theory to water allocation. Their discussion is limited to "existing water supplies", an
abstraction which serves to clarify their argument.
They begin their discussion by defining supply and establishing
the existing supply as a scarce good. This is followed by an application
of economic theory to determine whether alternative allocation propositions are desirable or undesirable. Care is exercised to point
out the difference between efficiency and distribution effects and the
position of economics in relation to these questions. The remainder
of the discussion is concerned with existing water allocative practices,
illustrating both correct applications and violations of economic principles .
Water supply is said to consist of recurring annual flows

res u~ting

from the hydrologic cycle, stocks in storage and water which may be
reused. Existing water supply is defined as that part of the above
mentioned supply for which man has developed utilization systems.
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Possible difficulties in interpretation of the concept of existing
supplies include the following: (a) Fluctuations in annual and seasonal
precipitation introduce variability over time to the nation as a whole
and more so for a given locality; (b) Withdrawal from stocks may be
at a rate greater than the rate of recharge; (c) Locality, seasonality,
quality, etc., establish water as something less than a perfectly interchangeable commodity; (d) Water used directly without using human
diversion facilities is excluded and is a part of existing supplies; (e)
Double counting is possible where multiple use occurs, i.e., water is
withdrawn, discharged, and reused.
Competition for the use of nature's resources is said to be an
obvious fact of life. If the amount of a resource employed in one use
is increased, there will be a lesser amount available for other uses .
If an additional quantity of water is diverted for irrigation or municipal

uses, downstream uses s.uch as navigation and power production may be
impaired. Lower stream flow may cause pollution problems which will
have an adverse affect on fish and wildlife, thus affecting recreational
uses. Where water is pumped from a common aquifer, an increase in
withdrawal by one user will directly affect the quantity available and
costs of the other users.
Other types of competition cited include regional, such as Upper
Basin versus Lower Basin on the Colorado River, and present versus
future use of nonrenewable stocks.
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Needs for water are indefinitely expandable and there will
always be competition for the use of existing supplies. Attempts
to eliminate competition by assigning the allocation problem to
politicians or administrators merely shift competition from the market
place into the political arena.
Granted that competition exists, economics is the science most
appropriate for evaluating alternative allocative propositions. The
economic effects of any proposal can be divided into two possible
categories. These are "effie iency" and "distribution" effects.
Economics can show us how to attain efficiency in allocation; also
something of the distributional consequences of alternative possible
policies, or institutional arrangements, but stops short of telling us
how to distribute any gains from increased effie iency. This is a
question left to the branch of philosophy known as ethics.
In allocating a scarce resource, economic efficiency is charac-

terized by what Hirshleifer, et al. call the principle of "equimarginal
value in use." The maximum amount of resources (dollars) a consumer
is willing to pay in order to obtain a unit of water is said to be the "value
in use" of that uni.t of water. The "marginal" value in use is said to
be the "value in use" of the last unit of water consumed.
The principle of "equimarginal value in use" then, is that the
resource (water) should be so allocated that the value in use of the
marginal unit is equal for all consumers or users of the resource in
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question. Should a disparity in the marginal value exist between users,
it will be mutually advantageous for both us ers if the resource moves
from the use of lower value to that of higher value, resulting in a gain
in efficiency. When no mutually advantageous exchanges are possible
between any pairs of persons desiring the resource, it is said to be an
efficient allocation.
It is suggested that an institutional arrangement with well-defined

property rights where free trading is permitted will lead to an efficient
allocation. Given these conditions, the market price of a specified right
to water should tend to the marginal value in use of those users in the
market. Market price measures marginal value in use to its consumers
for any commodity in which free trading is permitted and perfect rights
may be conveyed. If for some reason trading is restricted or conditional,
an efficient allocation will have been prevented.
Within the context of equimarginal value in use, Hirshleifer, et al.,
lists two rules of behavior which are necessary for an efficient allocation,
irrespective of institutional arrangement. The first, if rights to water
are vested as property, there should be no restriction on purchase and
sale of such rights, so long as third parties are not affected. This
was discussed above. The second, if water is sold, the price should
be equal for all customers. This is inferred in the discussion above
where the statement of equimarginal value in use is said to characterize
a situation in which the marginal value in use, for all users is equal.

13
Further, i.t was inferred that the marginal values in use, under the
assumption of free transfer and perfect title, tended toward the price
of the resource subject to allocation. If the marginal values in use are
equal, and these in turn approximate the selling price of the resource,
then, the price of the resource to all users should also be equal.
In practice, a number of limitations are imposed on a voluntary

exchange of water rights. Examples cited include the attachment of water
to a specific tract of land, transfers subject to the approval of an administrative agency, and legal codes which establish priority of uses.

Any

restriction such as these upon free transfer and disposition of the
resource, whether restricted with regard to place, purpose or transfer
to other persons interfere with market processes and preclude a more
efficient a llocation.
With the exception of adequate protection of the rights of third
parties, Hirshleifer, et al., find little reason to support the imposition
of these restrictions to transfer. They intimate that third parties are
often overprotected, priorities are often a one-way street especially
where condemnation proceedings are applicable , and court definitions of
"reasonable use" to prevent waste, at best, could only accomplish the
same objectives as the market processes.
Gaffney (7) presents a vivid des cription of diseconomies in resource
use (water) which may result from institutional rigidities. An example
is drawn from a case study of the Kaweah River system in Tulare County,
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California.
Gaffney begins by describing apparent diseconomies found throughout the river system. Included among these are the following : (a) There
is a strong indication of wide dispersion of marginal revenue productivi.ties
of water; (b) Annual variability in supply is greater for the individual
diversions than the natural variability for the whole system; (c) There
is considerable excess diversion capacity and overlapping of service areas;
(d) Conveyance losses are considerable and vary greatly between systems;
(e) There is inadequate reuse of water; (f) Unwarranted segregation of
streams has resulted in greater losses.
Gaffney then evaluates the role of water law in perpetuating these
diseconomies. This is done by listing numerous examples from the
Kaweah system where institutional rigidities have prevented a more
efficient use of the water supply.
Diseconomies are said to be associated with water law in the
following respects: (a) Productivity is not the initial bas is of water
rights. Law recognizes time and location; (b) Once a right is established,
water users are isolated from social opportunity costs; (c) Allegations
of transferability are not supported by any general demonstrations in
practice; (d) Transfers actually achieved have been severely hampered
by legal impositions involving points of diversion; (e) Excess water
available to holders of riparian and correlative rights are by law
completely nontransferable; (f) Sale of surplus water from a right
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contingent upon "beneficial use" could be interpreted to mean that the
surplus never was used beneficially, therefore it should revert directly
to other junior appropriators; (g) Third parties are often overprotected.
Settlement is not necessarily limited to the amount of actual damage.
The remainder of the paper is concerned with what Gaffney
satirically entitles the dynamic evolution shaped by water law.
Water law tends to reinforce other economic and political pressures,
which result in premature overdevelopment. Gaffney characterizes legal
perception of economic values as resembling the near-sighted Mr . Magoo.
It responds to the general outline of things, however inappropriately.
The tendency of legal response has been to present a stonewall of
disapproval upon inexpensive local adjustments, thus accentuating the
necessity for interregional transfers. This attitude has materially
accelerated the move toward heavily subsidized interregional transfers
while existing local supplies continue to be used L'lefficiently.
The large increment of water usually required for a successful
import project results in a cycle of overdevelopment. Lagging private
development on project-served lands encourage more starts than the
market can ultimately absorb .
Gardner (9) presents a discussion of allocative efficiency in

'

publicly owned grazing. Because of the apparent similarities between
grazing permits and water rights, a review of the methodology should
be helpful.
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The technique employed in determining allocative efficiency rests
upon the assumption that a perfectly competitive market can be used as
the optimum allocating device. Under this assumption, the equilibrium
price of a specified service should be the same for all users and equal
to the value of the marginal product derived from that service. Whether
or not misallocation is indicated becomes a matter of determining if
significant differences exist between the selling price and the expected
value of the marginal product derived from that service.
This problem becomes somewhat more complicated when applied
to grazing permits. Grazing services are sold at administered prices by
government agenc ies . Prices are often set below the expected value of
the margina l return. This results in the permit taking on a value somewhat greater than the purchase price. This is not necessar ily a market
value, but represents the value in use to the permit holder. If permits
are transferable, the selling price should approximate the cap italized
value of the difference between the administered price and the value of
the marginal product derived from the permit.
Gardner measures the extent of misallocation by determining the
difference, per unit of service, between the value of the marginal return
as measured by a net price paid for comparable private grazing services,
and the a dministered prices for public grazing. Mter incorporating an
expectation model to account for uncertainty, this difference is capitalized
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and compared with the market price of permits. If the selling price
of the permit is less than this capitalized value, it is evidence of
misallocation.

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONCEPTUAL
SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM
Theoretical Framework
When a resource, such as water, is scarce, an allocative scheme
which enables society to obtain a maximum social product or utility from
that resource is usually considered to be most desirable. The problem
then becomes one of finding criteria or common measure by means of
which alternative allocation possibilities can be evaluated.
Economic theory postulates certain schema pertinent to allocation
which describe the necessary conditions to attain a maximum product from
a given quantity of resource. Assuming that the perfectly competitive
market can be used as the optimum allocating device, and that social
product and private product are equal, an application of economic theory
can be quite helpful in providing qualified answers to these questions.
-1

Within the contest of this abstraction, the supply to the market
can be assumed to be fixed. Individuals desiring quantities of the resource
greater than they presently hold may obtain them only by bidding away
existing supplies from other individuals now holding the resource. Units
of the resource will move from one use or user to another any time the
marginal social product or the expected marginal social product is greater
when employed by the second alternative. These mutually beneficial adjustments or exchanges will continue until the marginal social product of an
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identical resource is equal for all users in the market. When this
equilibrium position is attained, the supply price, usually in dollars,
for a unit of the resource will approximate the value of the marginal
social product for that quantity of the resource. These two propositions
may be expressed symbolically as:
MSPx:: MSPy,
~-

~

= MSPn

~ 1 and (MSP . Psp)

= Pr,

~

Where:
MSP : marginal social product,
P
r

= the

market price,

the resource employed,

sp :: the social product,
x, y, ••. , n: specific uses or users.
Where x and y are the only uses or users of the resource, maximum
social productivity at varying levels of resource use is depected in
Figure 1. This assumes that prices of the aggregate output or benefit
derived from the resource are constant. The maximum return positions
are at F, F', and F", depending on the level of resource use. Where
the rate of substitution between the possible uses or users is equal to
the output price ratio, the cost of foregoing the use of one unit of the
resource in Y is just equal to the return from that unit when employed
in X. Assuming that the resource is infinitely divisible, any point a long
the expansion path from F to F" represents the most efficient allocation

20

y

Expansion path

F"

Iso return or
benefit lines

Iso resource
line

Figure 1. Graph depicts a most efficient allocation among competing uses
at varying levels of resource use where X and Y are the only
alternative uses.
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for that level of resource.
Figure 2 shows the maximum quantity of resource which can
profitably be absorbed into a particular use or by a particular user.
Equilibrium is attained at point E where P r interesects the value of the
marginal social product function. It is at this point that the cost of
procuring the last unit of resource is just equal to the value of the resulting
increase in social product and (MSP . Pspl = P r·
Throughout this discussion it has been assumed that the pricing
mechanism yielded an adequate indication of the desires of society and
that social benefits or utility derived from a resource could be expressed
in dollar terms. In a situation where a resource price is an administered
price or no market price has been established, it may be necessary to use
choice indicators other than price. However, this does not invalidate the
market mechanism as a means of determining allocative efficiency. Rather,
the problem becomes one of finding other nonmarket indicators which lend
themselves to an application of traditional economic theory (8).
It was assumed that the water market in the study area was

sufficiently competitive to allow the average seasonal rental price per acre
foot of water to be the choice indicator of the value placed on that quantity
of water. Although the size of the market area and prevailing conditions
within the market have been somewhat variable over time, this assumption
was not considered especially heroic because there is very little evidence,
if any, of uses whose valuation would not be reflected in this market price.
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VMP = MSP . Psp

r

Figure 2. Graph illustrating maximum quantity of a resource that can
profitably be absorbed by a particular use or user.
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Water is an intermediate good in most instances and is used almost
entirely as an input factor in the production of field crops.
Within the market area, the marginal cost of water to each
farmer is essentially equal. Each farmer is assumed to be able to buy
any quantity of water which he might need at the prevailing market price.
The action of one farmer will not exert a discernable affect on the price
of water or product prices.
Conceptual Solution
The perfectly competitive market was considered an appropriate
model for evaluating the performance of two alternative allocative schemes
which have been used in the study area. Relatively free market conditions
have existed in this area for many years. Records of the companies indicate
a history of 30 to 40 years of rental and sale of irrigation company stock.
Early residents indicate that "trades" were common practice even before
for mal records were cons ide red necessary.
For the purpose of this study, the water resource was regarded as
that limited part of the total physical quantity of water which possess
utility for irrigation purposes under utilization systems presently found
in the study area. This does not preclude an expansion of the supply in
the future, nor does it cast any reflection on other uses not considered
here. It merely serves to restrict the means of controlling the hydrological
cycle to those which are currently in operation. Our purpose was to abstract
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from the real world situation in order to gain some insight concerning
allocation and possible utilization of a fixed supply without the added
complication of considering the development of new supplies.
From the foregoing, it is deduced that a given supply of irrigation
water should be allocated such that the value of the marginal product should
be equal among all users. Further, the market price of a specified unit
of water should approximate the value of the marginal product derived
from the use of that quantity of water.
The determinant of supply and demand for water could be expected
to influence the market price of a specified unit of water. A priori the
total quantity of water available to the area appears to be an important
variable on the supply side. The demand side appears to be influenced by
the level of technology, the prices and quantities of other productive services
which may be used as substitutes or in combination with water, and the prices
of products produced by water.
The price of water may be further influenced on the side of both
supply and demand by the institutions which determine a llocation among
users. In order to determine the relative efficiency of alternative allocative
policies, as measured by changes in the price of water, the influence on
wate r price of all factors other than the change in allocative policy must
be held constant.
Assuming that all expectations concerning the supply and demand
determinants affecting water prices could be held constant over time, then
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the price of water could also be expected to remain constant. Should a
given change in pertinent water institutions be accompanied by a significant
change in the price of water, there would be evidence that selected changes
in the institutions have an affect on the efficiency of water allocation.
Depending upon the magnitude and direction of this response, it should
be possible to determine whether that affect is favorable or unfavorable.
A more efficient allocation is indicated by a higher price, a less efficient
by a lower price.
An approximation of the net gain or loss which would accrue to
society is obtained by capitalizing the product of the difference between
the per unit prices associated with any two allocative arrangements and
the tota l units of water available to the market area.

DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY AREA
Physical Description
The Delta area is located in the west-central part of the State
of utah, approximately 140 miles south and west of Salt Lake City. It
lies in the northeastern corner of Millard County and i.s a part of the
Sevier Desert. The total land area comprises approximately 180 square
miles or 115, 000 acres. Area tilled and irrigated appears to vary from
35 to 60 percent of this amount or from 40, 000 to 80, 000 acres (12) .
Topography of the area is generally smooth with slopes ranging
from less than 5 up to 20 feet per mile. The surface elevation ranges from
about 4, 565 to 4, 650 feet (17).
The climate of the Delta area is definitely arid as the mean annual
percipitation is less than 8 inches. Summer rains occur only infrequently
and are ina dequate for most types of crop production. Seasonal temperatures
vary from over 100 de grees during the summer months to -15 de grees in
winter. Killing frosts usually occur in early September but have been
known to occur as much as three weeks earlier . The last killing fr osts
in spring usually come late. in May.

Frosts during the growing season do

occur infrequently but are not a serious element of uncertainty. Hot
spring and summer winds are common. These have an adverse affect
on soil moisture and can be injur ious to various hay and seed crops (17).
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Soils consist of alluvial materials deposited in main part by
the Sevier River as its waters entered the ancient Lake Bonneville.
Disposition of soil types is wide and varied, apparently owing to sizable
fluctuations in the level of this lake. Texture of the soils ranges from
slick clays to dune sand, the clay types being most prevalent. Soluable
salts are present in varying concentrations throughout the area.
Meticulous irrigation and drainage practices are necessary to prevent
serious alkali problems from developing (17). Acreage of different soil
types are shown in Table 1.
As is intimated above, irrigation is a prerequisite for crop pro-

duction. Irrigation waters are derived from mountain and desert watersheds to the east and south. These enter the area via the natural course
of the Sevier River. During the period 1934 to 19 63, the annual water
supply has varied between 58, 233 and 151, 235 acre feet. The mean annual
delivery for this same period was 115, 006 acre feet. In order to augment
and stabilize the water supply, rather extensive storage and diversion
facilities have been constructed along the course of this river. These
have a combined storage capacity of approximately 250, 000 acre feet.
Except in periods of prolonged drought, these facilities serve admirably
for their intended purpose.
Crops well suited to the area under irrigation include alfalfa for
hay and seed, and small grains. At the present time, 80 to 90 percent
of the irrigated acreage is in alfalfa. Sugar beets and potatoes could
also be grown given a more adequate supply of water. Some idea of land

28
Table 1. Acreage of different soils, Delta Area (12)

Soil

Number of acres

Oasis clay

28,480

Gordon clay

12, 992

Friable phase
Slick phase

1, 856
384

Percent
24.7

13.2

Oasis silty clay
Loam
Light-textured bench phase
Oasis fine sandy loam
Bench phase
Abbot clay
Silty phase

14, 400
448

12.9

13, 440
128

11.8

8, 960
3, 136

10.5

11, 392

9.9

Woodrow clay loam

9,024

7.8

Woodrow clay

5, 376

4.7

Lynndyl gravelly sandy loam

1, 856

1.6

Cache loam

1, 408

1.2

Lahontan clay loam

1,344

1.2

512

.4

64

.1

Cache silty loam

Dune sand
Rough stony land
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use can be obtained by observing the data for Millard County in Table 2.
Roughly two-thirds of these totals can be attributed to the Delta area.
The economy of the Delta area is dependent almost entirely upon
the income derived from agricultural sources. The two largest sources
of income are alfalfa seed and livestock (22). In both cases, the production
of these products is either directly or indirectly dependent upon irrigation.
Hence, the allocation of irrigation water is a problem of primary importance
to the economy of the Delta area.
Development
A brief description of the settlement and development of Mormon
communities in general should be helpful in evaluating the subsequent
institutions which pertain specifically to the Delta area.
Settlement and construction of irrigation facilities
The first permanent settlement in the Delta area was established
in 1860.

As was the case in all of Utah and in limited areas in surrounding

states, this settlement was effected by Mormon families selected specifically
for that purpose by the authorities of the Latter-Day Saints Church. These
colonization efforts by the Mormons were communal in nature, being planned
and directed by the Church authorities. Companies of settlers were usually
limited to those groups large enough to supply the labor necessary for
construction of the various essential fixtures, and to discourage attacks
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Table 2. Land use in Millard County (22)

Land use
Number of farms

Irrigated
farms

533, 662

Acres of cropland

163, 499

Hay
Corn
Small grains
Alfalfa seed
Irish potatoes
Sugar beets
Other
Cropland used only for
pasture

81, 425

Total for
whole
county

Percent
of
total

905

768

Land in farms (acres)

Cropland harvested

Percent
of
total

100.00

593,390

100.00

175,850
15.26

84, 165

14. 18

45, 875b
3, 179b
27,403b
24, 577b
350b
319b
51b

39, 762a
3, 162a
15, 311a
21, 285a
35oa
319a
32a
31,754

5.95

3 5, 438

5.97

Cropland not harvested
50,320
and not pastured

9.43

56, 247

9. 48

12,980

2.40

14, 225

2.40

334, 377

62.66

379,209

63.91

Other land (lots, roads,
waste)

22,806

4.30

24, 106

4.06

Total land irrigated

75, 793

75, 793

Irrigated cropland harvested 68, 016

68, 016

Woodlands
Other pasture

Other irrigated land (not
cropland harvested)

7, 777

7, 777

a and bThese do not sum to A. Cropland harvested because of double
counting hay and alfalfa seed acreage.
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by hostile Indians. Families "called" or selected usually owned or were
supplied with the necessary implements, livestock, seed, etc . , making
the group as nearly self-sufficient as was possible. Upon arrival at the
proposed site of settlement, building a fort, platting the townsite, erecting
fences, clearing fields, and building the irrigation facilities were a ll
accomplished by community effort under the direction of the bishop (11,
p. 9-13).
This communal approach to colonization was undeniably successful
and probably the only means by which the desert could have been conquered
at that time. However, certain inefficiencies were inherent in the system
with regard to land and water use. Projects were small of necessity
because there was dire need for quick development and immediate returns.
Ditches were cons tructed where diversion was most easily accomplished
with little thought of potential development of either land or water. Know ledge essential for the construction of efficient irrigation systems was st ill
in the developmental stages and much of the construction equipment was
improvised and crude.
AB the settlements grew and new lands were required to support the

population, old ditches were extended and increased in size. The next step,
in many areas, was to build parallel facilities at higher and higher levels
which could supply the less convenient bench lands. The result of this
short-run policy was a maze of duplicate ditches, diversion facilities and
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management personnel in areas where ore well-designed facility could
have provided service to all users in a more efficient manner. In many
a reas, this sporadic period of growth resulted in greater losses of wate r,
water-logging of fertile low landf! higher maintenance costs, management
problems, and it increased the possibility of conflicts between users. It
should be recognized that these seemingly important factors were proba bly
considered mere trivia to the Mormon pioneer who faced starvation during
the first winter i.f immediate returns were sacrificed for future efficiency.
Ownership of land was usually limited to small parcels in an effort
to discourage speculation and to encourage a more intensive agriculture.
It also tended to localize the population while at the same time it encouraged

a more uniform social order and reduced the threat of Indian harassment.
Where settlers shared equally in initiating the community, ownership of
property within the townsite was determined by drawing lots. Other lands
were apportioned somewhat arbitrarily, usually in accordance with need
and ability to give proper care to the land. In both cases, a proportionate
share of the community water supply was assumed to accompany the
entitlement to land. In other instances, the amount of land granted was
proportional to the amount of labor contributed in the development of a
water supply, or conversely, obligation of labor toward the construction
and maintenance of the irrigation system was dependent upon the size of
the land holding. Ownership rights to land and water use thus acquired,
were later recognized by the State of Deseret, the Territory of Utah,
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and by the United States Government (11, p. 14-15).
From earliest times the building, maintenance, and management
of the various water systems had been subject to the direction of the local
church authority or his appointee and were an integral part of the
ecclesiastical regimen. However, as settlements became more firmly
established and the people attained a reasonable degree of security, a
cleavage developed between the religious and the secular organizations.
Control of the water supply appears to have been among the first segments
of community life to have been affected. Intuitively, this should have
resulted following an influx of nonmembers who did not accept the authority
of the Church or its leaders, but this did not prove to be the case. Local
members usually provided the impetus for change (11).
Prior to the establishment of civil government, it became customary
in many settlements for the men of the community to meet regularily,
in mass, to discuss problems affecting the general welfare of the settlement. These meetings provided an excellent opportunity to usurp the
power of the Church leaders in secular affairs. They still presided on these
occas ions, but suffered a considerable diminution in power as questions
brought before these meetings were usually decided in favor of the concensus of those present. The establishment of civil government and the
added influence of increasing numbers of non-Mormons tended to
crystallize this movement. If the Church authorities continued to wield
considerable influence in secular matters, it could usually be attributed to
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reasons other than their position in the Church.
Institutions
Early water organizations were very informal. Control by Church
authorities was replaced by committees or representatives selected by the
majority of the water users. With the advent of civil government, public
officials, especially town officers, became the heir apparent. This was a
logical secession in the typical Mormon community where almost all persons
lived within the confines of the town. The interests of the city dwellers no
doubt coincided with those who worked and irrigated the farms because
they were the same people. As the towns grew, conflicts of interest
developed between urban and rural users.

The usual result of such con-

flicts was a realignment of the user groups, each one sympathetic to its
own divergent interests (11, p. 16-27). This gradual transition of control
and refinement of purposes in the various water user groups plus the
application of a formal legal structure gave rise to several of the more
formal water institutions which have carried over to the present.
Many features of early water law and custom in Utah foreshadowed
current appropriative doctrL>1e. In 1852, the first territorial legislature
declared that natural resrurces, including water, were property of the
public and were to be administered by the county courts. As is intimated
above, ownership of land, water, and ditches were closely assoc.iat ed.
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Water was not readily transferable and was usually considered to be a
part of the land. The right was acquired by development and use, and
water could be used on lands not necessarily bordering the initial source
of supply. Water institutions in Utah were unique in that they were
generated in an agricultural economy, whereas the institutions of other
arid states were borrowed from the laws and customs of the miners .
Agricultural use of water outside utah was incidental until much later
(13, p. 220-241).
Unique Features of the Delta Area
Development in the Delta area was similar in most respects to
the remainder of Utah, but differs in certain important respects. Foremost among these was the difficulty encountered in making diversion from
the Sevier River and its subsequent affect on the type of development to
occur. Most settlements made prior to this time were accomplished on
small streams where relatively little effort and material were needed to
effectively divert irrigation water into a canal. The usual diversion
facility was constructed of a few well placed cottonwood trees, rock and
native hay.
Diversion in the Delta area was not so easily accomplished. Brush
and rock dams, even solid earthen dams, were repeatedly undermined and
washed away owing to the erosive nature of the soil. After repeated
failures, the first attempt to settle was abandoned. It was apparent
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that the usual methods of diversion would not be successful in this area.
In order to justify a more elaborate facility capable of effecting

diversion under these adverse circumstances, the project would necessarily
be larger, and require more labor and materials. When settlement was
attempted a second time in 1860, it was by a much larger group. It was
decided to build a dam of solid rock. This rock fill was extended well
into the river banks and pilings were used on the lower side of the dam.
Diversion was accomplished and several thousand acres of land were soon
brought under cultivation (4).
This was the first and last settlement effected by the Latter-Day
Saints Church, per se, in the Delta area. In 1866, the diversion dam again
failed and the first of several cooperative irrigation enterprises was begun.
Reconstruction and subsequent new development after that time were effected
mainly by Mormon people, but under forms of organization other than the
Church. The most predominant organization to emerge was the mutual
irrigation company . The rather active communal spirit imparted by the
Church, the aura of common interest, plus the advent of user control of
the water delivery systems provided a natural basis for the development
of the mutual company. Although mutual irrigation companies were common
in other parts of the state, the rather unique problems involved in the Delta
area gave rise to much larger organizations. The four mutual companies
which have emerged in that area have approximately 80, 000 acres under
their canal systems, an average of 20, 000 acres per company (22). This
is more than ten times as large as the average company in the state. This
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feature alone went far in reducing some of the inefficiencies mentioned
above which are associated with the smaller systems.
Organizations of this type were better suited for acquiring the
capital needed for the construction of extensive irrigation fac ilities
essential for the development of the Delta area. In addition, they
afforded much greate r flexibility in water use. stock ownership entitles
its owner to a specified portion of the water in the system, which can
be used on any land which can be reached by that company' s system, and
may be sold or rented if the owner does not need it. There are no restrictions as to the area within the canal system upon which this water may be
us ed; its owner uses his judgment in that matter (13, p. 235, 23 6) .
In summary, the Delta area was settled by Mormon families who

were accustomed to working together for a common purpose. Policies
regarding use of water reflected its dear qualities and in many respe cts
resembled present day appropriative doctrine. The usual transition of
control of the water supply experienced in other parts of the state was
greatly abbreviated in the Delta area. Substantially greater labor and
material requirements needed to develop a water supply necessitated a
more extensive development than had heretofore been the case. Although
initial development was abortive and more costly, many of the problems
associated with the smaller developments in other parts of the state were fore
gone . The primary organization to emerge was the mutual irrigation
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company . Policies a ssociated with these organizations led to much
greater flexibility in water use.
Other unique features found in the Delta area such as type of
rights, location of land with respect to supply, flexibility of control,
and third party affects will be considered in detail in the following
section.

THE WATER MARKET
The reliability of many of the measures used in this analysis
hinges upon the assumption that a market for water rights does exist,
and that the market price for a specified quantity of water is a good
approximation of the value of the marginal product derived from that
quantity of water. This initiates query as to the degree of competition,
homogeneity of product and factors, flexibility of water movement, and
the state of lmowledge associated with the study area. For this reason,
a description of the water market in the study area was considered an
essential part of the analysis.
In economics, a market is often described as a group of individuals,
buyers, and sellers of a particular product, with facilities for trading
with each other. In Utah, several rather distinct markets have developed
which tend to coincide with this description. A survey of irrigation
companies in the Sevier River Basin reveals that 90 percent of the
respondents have some approximation of a market where water rights
are exchanged between buyer and seller. Transfers are of three general
types: (a) Sale of water rights on a stream for changing point of
diversion,

(b) sale of irrigation company stocks, and (c) rental of

water or of irrigation company stocks.
In a majority of these cases, the market is quite inactive.

Sales
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are initiated only under extreme circumstances such as death of the
owner, sheriffs' sales, etc. However, in a few selected areas the
water market is very active. This is especially true in areas where
water can be rented either seasonally or on a per unit basis. The study
area is a notable example of thi.s latter group.
Factors Contributing Toward the
Development of a Market
There are a number of factors which appear to contribute toward
the development of a workable market for irrigation water. Included
among these are the following:

1. The supply is sufficiently scarce to make transfers between
users desirable; i.e., water must be a scarce "economic commodity;
2. The laws and customs governing irrigation water use wi.ll
accommodate transfers between users;
3. The water supply is of such quality, locality, and seasonality
that any part of the total supply is readily substitutable for any other part.
Not all of the above mentioned conditions are similar in areas
where markets have developed and the presence of these factors is no
guarantee that a market exists or may develop. However, these are
the factors most often associated with areas where operable water markets
have developed.
Scarcity
Transfers become desirable any time the cost of developing new
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supplies is greater than the consideration required to attract a similar
quantity of the existing supply . Perhaps a more relevant question is the
relative scarcity of water to each individual within a group dependent
upon a fixed supply. Here transfer is desirable any time a disparity
occurs in the marginal valuation placed on a given quantity of water by
different users. This ignores third party effects which will be discussed
below, but generally, it can be stated that any time an individual in a
probable market area desires a quantity of water to such extent that he
is willing to compensate other persons now holding the right to water in
an amount which will induce them to give up a unit voluntarily, transfer
is desirable.
A uniform distribution of supplies per acre or per user, does not
lessen the need of transfers between users; in fact, it increases it. Soils,
crops, choice of other inputs, and managerial ability, a ll of which may
have a substantial effect on the value of the marginal product of water are
not usually distributed evenly. Varying combinations of these elements
will necessitate some adjustments in the amount of water allocated to
each user if value of the marginal product is to be equal among all users.
Thus when supplies are scarce a nd other inputs are variable, it appears
that transfer would be desirable.
In the study a rea, irrigation water supplies are definitely limited.

Total water available at the farm for each season and water available per
irrigated ac r e are listed in Table 3.
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Table 3. Water available for use at the farm, 1950-1964

Year

Total
water
availablea

Water available per
irrigated acreb
Acre feet
Acre inches

1950

92, 693.2

1. 8168

21.8

1951

71, 111.2

1. 3938

16. 7

1952

114, 371.9

2.2417

26.9

1953

113, 521.0

2. 2250

26.7

1954

70, 266.8

1. 3772

16.5

1955

71, 178. 5

1. 3951

16.7

1956

48,170.0

.9441

11.3

1957

49, 564.9

• 9715

11. 7

1958

94,260.5

1.8475

22.2

1959

72, 096.3

1. 4131

17.0

1960

52, 686. 4

1. 0327

12.4

1961

42, 086. 5

.8249

9.9

1962

74,716.0

1. 4644

17. 6

1963

44, 945. 5

• 8809

10. 6

1964

53,333.5

1. 0454

12.5

a An aggregate of credit per share multiplied by shares outstanding.
bAcreage is based upon County Assessor' s records, 1965.
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From 1950 through 1964, the average quantity available per
irrigated acre was 16.7 acre inches with standard dev iation 5. 4 acre
inches. Figures on consumptive usE! for a similar area in central Utah
list the following annual consumptive use for ma jor field crops: alfalfa,
35.4 inches; corn, 21.2 inches; sugar beets, 26.4 inches ; wheat, 22. 4
inches ; other small grains, 20. 7 inches; and potatoes, 21.0 inches (5).
A comparis on of these consumptive use requirements with the water
available at the farm, serves to emphasize the degree of scarcity .
Certainly if stringent supply provides an impetus for the development of
a ma rket, this requirement is fully satisfied in the study area.
Water law and local custom
Water law and local custom are factors which can either enhance
or restrict the development of a water market. Generally, water laws
tend to reflect economic pressures; however, position action is sometimes
delayed to the point that it does little to expedite transfers (7). Local
customs appear to be endowed with an inertia which tends to perpetuate
accepted practices. This is not surprising, because specific and reliable
evidence of monetary benefits is extremely scarce. It seems perfectly
rationa l for water users to maintain the status quo when evidence is
inconclusive and only suggests betterment (18).
In order for any ma rket transfer arrangement to work satisfactorily,
water rights must be secure and sufficiently well defined by law so that
the product may be positively identified and rights conveyed to subs equent
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owners. Provisions for changing ownership, point of diversion, place of
use, and character of use should be maintained subject only to the adequate
protection of third parties (10).
Basically there are two types of security considerations pertinent
to water. The first involves legal certainty or security of tenure and
the second physical certainty. Where water markets are concerned, it
is this element of legal certainty which is important. Buyers and sellers
of water should be able to determine without question who owns specifically
defined rights to water supply. Under the appropriate doctrine, leg-al
certainty means that prior appropriators are protected against junior
users, and juniors are protected against increased use by the senior
right holders (10).
Physical certainty as such is not dependent on the law, but is
subject to the laws of nature because droughts, floods, rainfall, etc. are
not responsive to man-made laws (10).
Third party effects, or spillover benefits and losses, become a
serious impediment to transfer only when the definition of the water right
is incomplete. In a situation where the water is not entirely consumed in
its initial use and subsequent rights are granted on the basis of return
flows, identification problems may become very complex. This does not
reduce the desirability of free transfer, but tends to re-emphasize the
necessity of finding reliable measures of return flow so that transfers
can be effected when desirable and third parties can be protected.
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In the study area, as in all of Utah, the appropriative doctrine

is the accepted body of water law.

All water is declared to be property

of the public . Rights to the use of unappropriated water are acquired
on the basis of "first in time, first in right" and are contingent upon
continuous "beneficial use " (24, 73-1-1, 73-1-3, 73-3-21). Under the
appropriative doctrine, a water right is generally considered as real
property . So long as the water flows in the natural water course, rights
are limited to usufractuary rights or right to use . After diversion from
the water course, water may be reduced to physical possession and as
such is considered as personal property of the right holder (10, p. 231).
It is important to note that mere possession of a water right may not

guarantee a supply of water to the owner of the right.

Prior rights must

be satisfied before any water accrues to junior right holders. When the
stream is appropriated in excess of flow or when dry years occur, the
supply may be such tl:at junior rights must give way to prior right
holders {24, 73-3-21).
Under the appropriative system, a water right is not usua lly
contingent upon the ownership of certain lands. The water right ordinarily
accompanies the land, but when deed, eparately it may be sold separate
from the land (24, 73-1-10) - Appurtenance does exist in some cases,
usually as a by-product of an earlier effort to obtain credit for irrigation
works. Assignment of the water to specific tracts of land was thought
to reduce speculation and provide an added degree of security for the
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investor (19, p. 231-243). In certain cases, these have outlived their
intended purpose and now serve only as a barrier to flexibility.
General provisions in Utah water law with regard to changing
ownership, point of diversion, and place and character of use appear to
accommodate flexibility in water use in most respects (25).

As is pointed

out above, a water right, subject to certain limitations, may be treated
as any other real property. Thus, any of the foregoing changes may be
accomplished provided the limitation is not unsurmountable. However,
problems associated with water right identification and third party effects
are not always resolved. The possibi.li.ty of involvement in litigation and
the inconvenience and uncertainty of having to submit proposals of change
to an administrative agency or the courts for approval might have a
dampening effect on transfers (2).
In the study area, much has been done to positively identify water

rights. In 193 6, the Fifth Judicial District Court in Millard County
rendered a decree adjudicating all rights along the Sevier River. Four
mutual irrigation companies, which service all of the study area, control
the water rights for the irrigation of about half of the irrigated lands
along the Sevier River (4). Within these companies the various water
rights accorded under the appropriative law, with their varying priorities,
have been maintained in order to satisfy legal requirements and to
apportion yearly supply among the four companies. The usual confusion
and litigation ordinarily associated with water rights is minimal, apparently
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owing in large part to the small number of claimants involved and their
long history of collective endeavor.
Further complication involving return flows i.s virtually nonexistent
because of the location and topography of the study area. Virtually all of
the water entering the area is consumed. The Sevier River follows the
highest contour of the Sevier Desert area. Surface strata slope away from
the river, thus return flows are negligible. Water which may run off is
collected in artificial drains and is of such poor quality that it is unsuitable
for further irrigation uses (4). It is evident that transfers in the study
area encounter fewer obstacles because identification is easier and third
party affects are at a minimum.
As is intimated above, community attitude or custom may have con-

siderable affect on eventual development of water markets. In the absence
of tangible evidence of potential gain, local interests may lack the impetus
to initiate changes in policy which will benefit the majority of water users .
In at least one such case, a public agency assumed the responsibility of

assembling specific and reliable information concerning irrigation company
activities, and of making recommendations for sound, workable improvementf
In 1936, the Utah Agricultural Experiment Station completed an

investigation of the study area. It was a comprehensive study of irrigation
and drainage, soil, economic and social conditions. In the following
spring, the Experiment Station, under the direction of 0. W. Israelsen,
went to the area for the purpose of initiating some of the recommendations

48

of this study.
Foremost among these was a proposal to consolidate all of the
irrigation compan ies and drainage districts in the area . In spite of what
appeared to be undeniable evidence in its favor, it met with opposition
from local irrigation officials. However, all was not lost . In the years
following, the merits of these proposals became generally known among
the stockholders of the various companies, with the eventual result that
most of the major recommendations were initiated by the efforts of the
local water users (4).
Homogeneity of the factor
The quality, locality, and seasonality of water are of extreme
importance if water is to be transferred successfully between uses . Where
transfer within a given use is concerned, water quality does not appear to
be restrictive except in the case of some extremely sensitive crops .
Generally, water used to irrigate one crop or farm is equally well
suited for the irrigation of other crops or farms . Quality and location
may be related to some extent where coveyance from one place to
another reduces qua lity. However, location is a greater problem because
of the physical barriers it presents in effecting transfers . Even where
conveyance facilities exist, losses incurred between places of use may
prohibit transfer. Even if a specified quantity of water were valued at
ten dollars in its present use and twenty dollars in its alternative use,
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there would be little point in transferring it if half of the water were
lost in conveyance.
Seasonality of supply may tend to encourage transfer. Where
both direct flow and storage rights are held by different individuals,
transfers may have a highly complementary effect upon the supply .
During the early season when irrigation requirements exceed dire ct flow,
transferred s torage water could be used to good advantage by the direct
flow right holders. Later in the season when storage is depleted and
river flows increase, it may be advantageous for the storage right holders
to obtain water from the dire ct flow right holders. This would have the
effect of extending the supply over the season and making the water
available at a time when it is most useful to crops.
In the study area, water quality is not good.

Along the upper

portion of the river, there are several tight dams, where all the flow is
diverted. That part of the water not consumed eventually returns to the
river where it is again diverted for irrig-ation. In this manner the waters
are used over and over again along the 225 mile extent of this river. This
complete use is not accomplished without certain negative consequences.
Each time the water is used, additional quantities of soluable salts are
retained in solution, thus reducing the quality of the water appreciably.
However, with adequate drainage, it still can be used successfully for
the irrigation of all crops commonly grown in the area.
Locality of water with respect to arable lands is favorable in the
study area. With the exception of a small amount of underground water,
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all of the supply enters the area via the Sevier River, such that it can
be diverted into any of the four systems. All storage water can be used
by any one of the four companies with the exception of 4, 000 acre feet
which is sometimes stored in the Gunnison Bend Reservoir.
The dispersion of irrigable lands favors the concentration of water
in the Delta vicinity. This allows the water to be used on the best soils
while at the same time foregoing excessive canal losses which are
associated with the irrigation of lands farther from the source (23).
In the study area, the water rights of two of the companies are

based largely upon direct flow from the r iver, while the remaining two
are dependent primarily upon storage. Storage is made up of river
flow for the period October 1 to March 1 of each year. Fall and late
winter storms favor the storage rights, while spring and summer storms
favor the direct flow rights. Transfer of water between companies tends
to reduce variability in supply for all four companies ( 4).
Operation of the Water Rental Market
Credits
The technique employed in handling transfers of water in an
irrigation company resembles the account ing system of a bank. Each
year in the early part of April, a water dividend based on reservoir
storage and anticipated runoff from snowpack, less estimated system
losses, is announced and credited to the accounts of each of the four
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companies in accordance with their respective water rights. These
amounts are then credited to the accounts of the individual shareholders
in proportion to the amount of stock they hold in the company. If the
water supply improves, an additional dividend may be declared at a
later date which is credited in the same manner. Persons responsible
for making this estimate exercise extreme care because of the ruinous
situation which can develop if book credits greatly exceed actual supply.
The individual account of each farmer represents his water supply for
the season, and he makES his plans accordingly. It would be disconcerting,
at best; a disaster, at worst, to discover in midseason that the actual
supply was exhausted when plans based on established water credits called
for additional irrigation.
Transfers and "basis of exchange"
Withdrawals for irrigation and all types of transfer are reflected
in both the individual accounts and those of the companies. It should be
noted that not all recorded transfers of water between companies result
from a rental or purchase of water from another system. Often one landowner will have acreage under two or more of t hese systems. Under these
circumstances water may move from one system to another with no
accompanying change in ownership.
Prior to 1948, only intracompany transfers were permitted.
Transfer between individuals within the same company was a relatively
simple matter. The account of the person giving up water was debited
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and the account of the person receiving water was credited. Following
a change in policy in 1950, exchanges have been possible on both an
intracompany and an intercompany basis among all four companies.
The water credits of any one company may be transferred to the credit
of any other, subject to the established "basis of exchange. "
This " basis of exchange" is an amount in addition to the face
amount to be transferred which is debited to the company giving up the
water and credited to the company receiving the water. Suppose farmer A
in company X wishes to rent 10 acre feet of water to farmer Bin company Y.
Where the common " basis of exchange" is 40 percent,

fan~er

A will be

debited for 10 acre feet, company X will be debited for 16. 67 acre feet,
company Y will be credited with 16. 67 acre feet, and farme r B will be
credited with 10 acre feet. It is essentially a means of accounting for
system loss in the various companies; however, it appears rather
ineffectual when the rate is the s ame for all companies regardless of
system losses. If percentage losses in each of the systems were exactly
the same, there would be little problem in establishing a "basis of
exchange. " It should be an :tmount just equal to the loss incurred in
making delivery.
When losses vary between systems, a common "basis of exchange"
tends to favor certain companies and discriminate against others depending
upon · two factors. The first roncerns their losses relative to the "basis
of exchange", and the second hinges on whether a company is primarily
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an exporter or an importer of water. Members of a system having
losses in excess of the accepted "basis of exchange" would suffer if
substantial quantities of water were rented into the system because the
"basis of exchange" would not be sufficient to offset actual losses
incurred in delivery. If the full amount of the transfer is delivered into
the second system, the supply for that system will be reduced by an
amount equal to the amount by which system losses exceed the "bas is
of exchange." Conversely, when the "basis of exchange" is substantially
greater than actual losses incurred in delivery, all users in the system
would benefit from a transfer into that company.
The relative position of each company with respect to the "basis
of exchange" has some rather obvious implications on the prevailing rental
price. These will be considered under the discussion of price below.
In practice, this "basis of exchange" has been set at what appears

to be an amount at least equal to the greatest·system loss. This would
allow transfer into any company without adversely affecting the amount
of water available to other users in that company. A policy on this order
would favor the importer compary and discriminate against the exporter.
Every company is wholly compensated for system loss on imported water
and others having lower system losses should realize a net gain from imports .
From the perspective of the exporter company, a "basis of exchange" set
at the highest system loss may be restrictive to transfer. To transfer
out of the company would cause a net loss to that system of an amount
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equal to the difference between the "basis of exchange" and the actual
system losses.
Accounts showing net intercompany transfers for the years 1951
through 1962 are shown in Table 4. In this series of years, company B
shows a marked tendency to export, company C to import. A priori this
would suggest that more marginal users are associated with company B.
Although this may be true in other instances, a closer examination of
this company reveals that its location and water supply relative to
irrigated acreage within the system proba.bly account for this export
position. Company B is almost completely surrounded by the other
companies. Supply to this company per irrigated acre is consistently
higher than the other companies. Where water supplies are greater
and the service area cannot be expanded, it seems logical to assume
that water will move out of this system.
Company C, the importer, consistently has less water per
irrigated acre than the other companies. The current "basis of exchange"
may favor this company as an importer because of reduced system losses
resulting from canal lining. Under these circumstances, company C could
be expected to import a greater amount of water.
Net debits and credits resulting from intercompany transfer in
the remaining companies appear to be quite random in occurrence. However, if the water supply for the whole area is compared with the debitcredit position of each company, a certain pattern can be ascertained.
When the water supply tends downward, the storage companies initially
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Table 4. Intercompany transfers for the years 1951 through 1963

Year

ComEany A
Export Import

1951

85

1952

1.011

Com~an~

Export

B

1mport

Company C
Export Import

680
146

Company D
Export Import

620

25

1, 476

2, 633

1953
1954
1955

595

1, 205

187

1956

410

726

376

1957

1, 458

66

1958

761

629

166
1, 516

1959

639

1, 286

1960

36

328

1961

28

355
414

1962
1963

2,471

Total

3, 174

594

4, 734

298
409

21

385

431

104
659

615

383
501

60

798

953

6, 488

423

1, 046

5, 383

Source: Records of the four companies in the Delta Area.

120
2, 703
3, 934

4, 024
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become debtors , exporting water to the direct flow companies. If the
de clining trend persists, they tend to move back to the position of a
creditor and import water . When a recovery in supply begins, the dire ct
flow companies tend to become debtors and export to the storage
companies.
This is illustrated in Table 5 where the annual water supply for
the area and the debit-credit positions of company A, a storage company,
and company D, a direct flow company, are compared. Wi.th but one
exception, in the period of years 1951 through 1963, the position of the
s to rage company was opposite that of the direct flow compa ny . A marked
recovery in 1952 saw company D exporting, company A importing; a
downward movement in supply in 1956 provides the exception; but
supplies up to that point were probably so stringent that storage was
already depleted. A r ecovery in 1958, a decline in 1959, a recovery in
19 62, and a decline in 19 63 all follow the prescribed pattern.
Where the ''bas is of exchange'' represents an amount that is
mutually acceptable to a ll of the companies and is subject to revision,
should it be desired, it seems logical to assume that this figure would
represent an equilibrium exchange position among the companies. Thus,
over a period of years including a complete cycle in supply conditions,
the problems associated with the "basis of exchange" will probably
average out.
In the future as water becomes even more scarce than at present,
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Table 5.

Export-import position of typical storage and primary right
companies under various supply conditions

Year

Water available
(acre feet)

Change in supplya

Company A
storageb

Company D
primaryb

(acre feet)
(21, 582. 0)

1951

71,111.2

1952

114,371.9

43, 260. 7

1953

113, 521.0

(850. 9)

1954

70, 266.8

(43, 254. 2)

1955

71,178.5

1956

48,170.0

(23, 008. 5)

1957

49, 564.9

1,394.9

1958

94, 260. 5

44, 695. 6

1959

72, 096.3

(22, 164. 2)

+

1960

52, 686.4

(19, 409. 9)

+

1961

42, 086.5

(10, 599. 9)

1962

74, 716.0

32, 629.5

1963

44, 945. 5

(29, 770. 5)

.

911.7

..
..

+
+

aDecreases in water available are denoted by parentheses ( ).
b A net export is denoted by ( +), and a net import is denoted by (-).
Source : Records of the four companies in the Delta Area.
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it seems reasonable to assume that much will be done to reduce system
losses. It may well be that this is one of the cheapest sources of
additional supply still available to the area. Should system losses be
substantially reduced and tend to converge at that point where water
becomes cheaper to secure from other sources, it should help to reduce
problems associated with intercompany transfer of water, especially the
"basis of exchange" problem. Ideally, all system losses would converge
at zero and the "bas is of exchange" could then be ignored.
Rentals
In the study area, most transfers involving the market are of three

general types. These include sale of irrigation company stock, the rental
of irrigation company stock, and the rental of water on a per acre foot
basis . The last of these is by far the most common.
Records indicate that rentals have occurred in some of the companies
for more than 30 years. Undoubtedly "trades" were common practice long
before any formal records were kept.
Price
A rental agreement can be initiated in a number of ways. In most
instances, a dollar value per acre foot is agreed upon before an exchange
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is culminated, although other arrangements are sometimes involved. 1
Many farmers who rent water regularly have rather well defined sources
of supply.

Price and quantity are determined and the agreement is

reported to the record clerk who records the changes in debits and credits
in their respective accounts. In other instances, farmers having water to
rent leave word with the record clerk who serves as a quasi broker and
passes the information on to others who may wish to rent additional water.
It is not uncommon for individuals having water for rent to engage the
record clerk or some other person closely associated with the water
market to rent their water for them. Accounts where water is held
separate from the land or where land has been abandoned and the water
rights retained, are often handled in thiS manner. Where irrigation
companies hold water credits which are to be rented, care is taken not
to enter the market before the rental price has been fairly well established
by the transactions of individual farmers. This precludes criticism with
regard to price setting and institutionalized prices . Thus, it appears that
price is determined largely by the interaction of supply and demand conditions
which prevail in the area at the time each rental agreement is initiated.
Rental prices fluctuate between years and to some extent within
1Late in the irrigation season, storage water is sometimes rented
on the basis of an acre foot now for an acre foot in return in the following
spring. This allows the person having unused water at the end of a season
to forego an inevitable 15 or 20 percent reservoir shrink. This practice
may also be used in connection with direct flow water, but the incentives
are not nearly so obvious.
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years. Average annual rental price per acre foot of water appears to
be inversely correlated with the water available at the beginning of the
irrigation season . Other factors which could be expected to have some
effect on the rental price include product prices, other inputs, and
t echnology. These variables wi.ll be considered in more detail in the
next section.
Within year variation in water rental prices may be attr ibuted to a
multiplicity of factors. Foremost a mong thes e would be changes in the
water supply not accounted for in the dividend. Natural disasters and
abrupt changes in the prices of other inputs or products produced may
also introduce within season price variation .
Company policy on hold over water is another factor influencing
within season price change. If a farmer is prudent and has unus ed water
at the end of the s eason, it ma y be rented or stored, depending upon the
company and the type of right. If he has the option to store it, the rental
price should be higher than would be the case i.f he would lose the water if
it were not used during the current season.

Prior to 1938, any water that

remained in the Sevier Bridge Reservoir at the end of the irrigation season
became common water and was used to make up the storage rights for the
next year. Because only two of the companies depended primarily upon
storage and the others on direct flow, this policy tended to work in favor
of the storage companies. This resulted in waste of water, because the
holders of dire ct flow rights attempted to use up all of the ir water supplies
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during the current season, rather than allow them to accrue to the storage
companies. This was further accentuated by the fact that there were no
intercompany transfers at that time. Since 1938, the four companies in
the study area have allowed any water remaining in the Sevier Bric;lge
Reservoir at the end of the irrigation season to belong to the company
which had right to it during the current year. This water can be held
over by that company to be used in the following season. The same
privilege is a lso extended to the accounts of the individual shareholders
within the companies. This policy has contributed greatly to the stability
of the water supply because more water is carried over in years of
abundance (4).
With the advent of intercompany transfers, the rental price may be
further affected. As was noted above, when system losses are less than
the prevailing "basis of exchange", the importing company may realize
a net surplus from the transaction. Suppose a given system has a 25
percent system loss and the "basis of exchange" is 40 percent. There
is a net gain of 15 percent which accrues to the importing system. Thus
in aggregate, the water users in the second system receive an amount
of water greater than the face amount of the transfer effected between the
individuals involved. This "surplus" is first reflected in the company
account and will eventually be reflected in the accounts of all the individuals
holding stock in the company. Whether it becomes available to the farmer
in the current season or during the following season is dependent upon the
action taken by the company officials. They may declare a dividend in which

62

case it will be available during the current season, or they may hold
it over, using it to make up individual water credits for the following
season. In either case, it eventually accrues to all stockholders in
the company in proportion to their respective holdings in the company.
If this is generally recognized among the users in the importing system,

it would have the affect of biasing the rental price upwards. It may
appear that they are renting one acre foot, when in fact, they are renting
one acre foot plus a proportionate share of the 15 percent.
A similar bias may be present in the case of the exporting company
having system losses somewhat less than the " basis of exchange." If
this aggregate loss to the system is realized by the individual users on the
system, they will demand a price which will compensate for it. Thus,
ceretis paribus the presence of this type of influence would cause the
rental price to be higher.
In both instances, the affect of influences of this type on rental

price would appear to be dependent upon two factors. The most obvious
is the amplitude of the disparity between the "basis of exchange, " and
the system losses. The second is dependent upon the reaction of
individuals to group incentives. Where all of the companies alternate,
at least to some extent, between the roles of exporter and importer,
these net effects resulting from the "basis of exchange" may not
persist long enough to be recognized and exploited by the companies
to the point that the rental price reflects its influence.
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Evidences of Flexibility
Transfers
The rental price, the number of transfers, and the percent of
the water supply transferred under varying supply conditions should
provide indicators of flexibility between users. These data are presented
in Table 6. Intercompany transfers in which the water did not change
ownership are not included in these data. The physical quantities transferred ranged from 5, 305 acre feet to 20, 993 acre feet per season. This
amount does not vary greatly until the water available drops below 70, 000
acre feet, after which it tends to diminish rather abruptly. As the total
supply diminishes, it seems logical that less water would be available for
rental.
A somewhat different picture is presented where each year's transfers
are expressed as a percentage of the water available for that year. Column
5 in Table 6 includes the result of this calculation. As water supply
diminishes, the percentage transferred tends to increase until supplies
drop below the 70, 000 acre foot level. Below this point, the percentage
of the water available that is transferred tends to drop off, as do the
physical quantities.
It is interesting to note that at 70, 000 acre feet each irrigated

acre in the area has a theoretical supply of about 1. 4 acre feet per acre.
Persons familar with the area estimate that this is a bare minimum of
water to sustain production under present cropping patterns. If the area
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Table 6. Changes in quantity transferred, rental price, and number of
transfers at decreasing levels of water available, 1950-1964a

Year

Water
available
for delivery

Quantity
transferred

(acre feet)

(acre feet)

Transfers as
Rental
a percentage
price per
of total
acre footb water available

No. of
transfersc

1952

114, 371. 9

12,709.26

3.95

11.11

389

1953

113, 521.0

17,913.20

2.70

15.78

468

1958

94.260.5

17,868.90

4.98

18.96

629

1950

92, 693.2

20,992.66

3.55

22. 65

486

1962

74, 716.0

12, 466. 24

9.94

16. 68

462

1959

72, 096.3

13,537.75

6. 96

18.78

561

1955

71, 178. 5

15, 851. 55

6.44

22.23

541

1951

71, 111. 2

18, 612.92

5. 66

26.17

604

1954

70,266.8

20,409.77

6. 46

29.05

596

1964

53,333.5

6, 976. 49

15.00

13.08

324

1960

52, 686. 4

10, 531. 13

15.89

20.22

494

1957

49, 564.9

6,683.35

15.15

13.48

375

1956

48,170.0

8,283.66

10 . 40

17.20

406

1963

44,945.5

9, 089. 67

16.95

20.22

483

1961

42,086.5

5,305.29

19.94

12. 61

291

aincludes only those transfers in which a change in ownership was apparently
involved.
bAdjusted to real terms by using the U. S. Wholesale Price Index, 1957-59
base.
cDoes not include those transfers to church and city property of less than
2. 5 acre feet.
Source: RecorCis of the four irri!ffiti.on companies in the Delta area.
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is rather homogeneous with respect to crops grown and water use per
acre, it seems logical to assume that adjustments downward from this
point would come about only as substantially higher water prices
because it would entail an abandonment of land. Although land costs
are fixed and probably would not influence this decision, farm labor
is quite immobil!i! and alternative employment in the area is scarce.
The uncertainty connected with finding a market for his unused labor
off the farm may cause the behavior of an individual farmer to appear
irrational in the short-run. He may retain water even though the rental
price is greater than the expected marginal return he envisions.
The reduction in quantity transferred and number of transfers at
lesser levels of supply is further explained by the reaction of water users
to an increased price for water. Except in the case of Giffen's Paradox,
a rational individual will always demand less of a commodity at higher
prices than at lower prices. This is illustrated in Figure 3 using
hypothetical data for illustrative purposes. Three acre feet will clear
the market when the price is five dollars, but when this price is increased
to fifteen dollars, only 1 acre foot will be taken.
As the rental price becomes higher and higher, the value of

marginal product of fewer and fewer users will be great enough to allow
them to purchase additional water.

By comparing Column 3 and Column 4

in Table 6, it is readily apparent that quantity transferred varies
inversely with the rental price.
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Price
per
a c re
foot

D

15

10

5 [ - · - - - - + - - - - -- - - D

1

2

Quantity of water demanded in acre feet

Figure 3. Hypothetical demand curve for water.
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The quantity of water involved in intercompany transfe rs should
also be indicative of flexibility of control within the area.

The gross

amounts of intercompany transfers for the years 1951 through 1963 are
shown in Table 7. It should be noted that these figures come from the
company accounts and, as such, they include the "basis of exchange"
and transfers which involved no change in ownership. For these reasons,
they are not comparable to those data presented in Table d. The suppiy
figure used here is the aggregate quantity diverted into the various systems
during each year.
Physical quantities transferred between companies reveal a rather
incoherent pattern under increasing drought conditions. In periods of
sustained drought, these percentages tend to increase signaling the
importance of intercompany transfer under drought conditions.

Four

miniscule changes in the "basis of exchange" during this period of time
probably serve to confound some of the implications which might be
drawn from these data.

The rather gradual increase in the percentage

and quantity of water transferred since 1954 may be accounted for in
part by adjustments toward a m!ltually satisfactory "basis of exchange"
among the companies.
VariabilitY in supply
Flexibility is indicated by a reduction in the variability in supply
between years. Data and statistical measures presented in Table 8
tend to verify this observation. For the series of years 1950 through 1963,

Table 7. The affect of changes in annual water deliveries upon the quantity of water involved in intercompany transfers, 1951-1963

Year

Arrayed in terms of river diversion
Total annual
river diversion
Percentage
at the head
Quantity
of total
of canals
transferreda transferreda
(acre feet)

Year

(acre feet)

Arrayed by years
Total annual
river diversion
Percentage
Quantity
at the hea d
of total
transferred t r ansferred
of canals
(acre feet)

(acre feet)

1953
1958
1952
1954
1951

150, 155
147, 103
132,739
131, 055
126, 279

3,895.00
4, 519 . 39
4, 241.08
1, 135.00
5, 416.57

2.59
3.07
3.20
. 87
4.29

1951
1952
1953
19 54
1955

126, 279
132, 739
150, 155
131, 055
115, 486

5, 416.57
4,241.08
3, 895.00
1,135.00
3,055. 93

4.29
3.20
2. 59
. 87
2. 65

1959
1955
1962
1960
1956

116,315
115,486
102, 061
85, 568
83,479

4,005.30
3, 055.93
8, 621.73
2,325.48
2, 165 . 22

3.44
2.65
8.45
2.72
2.59

1956
1957
1958
1959
1960

83, 479
79,890
147, 103
116,3 15
85, 568

2, 165.22
3, 115. 05
4, 519. 39
4, 005 . 30
2,325.48

2.59
3.90
3.07
3.44
2. 72

1957
1963
1961

79, 890
76, 446
67,209

3,115.05
9, 839.28
6, 013.79

3.90
12.87
8.9 5

1961
1962
1963

67,209
102, 061
76,446

6, 013. 79
8, 621.73
9,839.28

8.95
8.45
12.87

aFigures listed here are not comparable to those in Table 6 because these figures were taken from the
company accounts, not individual farmer accounts. These figu res also include transfers from one s ystem
to another with no accompanying change in ownership.
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Table 8. River diversions with and without adjustment for intercompany transfers, 1950-1963a

Year

Company A
With
Without

Company B
With
Without

Company C
With
Without

Company D
Without
With

(acre feet)

(acre feet)

(acre feet)

(acre feet)

1950
1951
1952
1953
1954

20,327
17,838
22, 735
24,033
23, 660

19, 467
17,247
21,259
20, 138
22,525

37, 930
39,007
37, 384
42, 162
38,930

38, 790
39,032
40,017
45, 750
40, 065

51,
45,
48,
58,
46,

1955
1956
1957
1958
1959

19, 550
12, 620
16, 010
25,710
18, 3 65

19, 363
12, 371
16, 605
25,544
16, 849

34,219
22, 944
23, 624
42,293
32, 325

33,796
22,878
24,421
42,591
31, 916

40,243
31, 410
26, 048
51, 780
43, 660

1960
1961
1962
1963
Mean
Standard deviation
from mean

13,242
11, 656
19, 411
12, 751
18,422.4

13, 263
24,453
12,087
18, 125
32,058
18, 752
12,391
24,011
17,704.3632,109.14

24, 068
18,021
32,210
21, 295
32,489.2)

29,448
29, 484
23, 847
23, 875
32, 598
32,020
26, 056
27, 563
39,648.79 39,479.21

4, 649. 61 4, 116.74 2, 543.2A

4 82UIJ

830
598
250
135
180

3, 559.23

51,
45,
47,
58,
46,

830
484
239
442
180

39, 648
31, 036
24, 590
51,019
44, 299

3, 555.86

26, 239
23, 83 6
24, 370
25, 825
22, 285

26, 239
24,516
24,244
25,825
22,285

21 ,
16,
14,
27,
21,

22, 679
17,194
14,274
27,949
23, 251

474
505
208
320
965

18, 425
13, 581
18, 097
14, 988
20, 651.29

18,753
13, 226
19, 079
15, 197
21,049.36

4, 671.97

4, 754.35

aDifferences between diversions shown here for companies C and D and those shown in the river reports
are due to losses in canal A.
Source: Records of the four companies in the Delta area.
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two series of annual water divers ions are listed for each company. In
each case, the column titled " with" indicates t he quantity of water
diverted into that company's system after adjustment for intercompany
transfers. Similarly, the column titled "without" indicates the physical
quantities that would have been diverted into each company' s s ystem without intercompany transfer

0

A comparison of the standard deviations for each company, with
and without transfer, indicate that variability in supply is reduced in two
companies, remains substantially the s ame in one, and increases only in
company A. The unique position of company A may be partially explained
by the fact that it is a consistent importer of water. Even in years of
relatively abundant supply as in 1952, 1953, and 1958, this company
continued to import water. This initiates speculation concerning the
possibilities for expanding the irrigated acreage within that company's
system to correspond with each season 's water supply

0

Rental price versus sale price
In a world free of uncertainty in which impediments to transfer do

not exist, the capitalized value of the expected annual rental price should
approximate the selling price of a perpetual right to a similar quantity of
water. A comparison of these two values is presented in Table 9.
Several refinements were made in the data in order to facilitate a
meaningful comparison. Because rental and sale price observations were

Table 9. A comparison of the sale price per acre foot of water expected to be delivered and the
capitalized value of the expected rental price per acre foot

Company A

Year

Capitalized
rental
price

Sale
price

Company B
Capitalized
rental
price

--

Company C

Sale
price

--

1955
1956
1957
1958
1959

93.80
97.80
130.00
192.20
184.00

65.24
69.80
63.57
76.64
97.54

1960
1961
1962
1963
1964

187.00
215.00
238.80
263. 60
313. 60

120.08
120.12
122.26
159.91
164.45

263. 60
313. 60

101.05
161. 82

Mean

191. 58

105.96

199.44

98.4

t value

97.80
130.00
192.20

--

71.48
58.05
99.60

--

----

3.363*

----

2. 296a

Capitalized
rental
price

--130.00
--

Company D

Sale
price

--

-81.00

--

Capitalized
rental
price

Sale
price

93.80
97.80
130.00
192.20
184.00

74.99
82.77
85.82
95.82
100.75

184.00

119. 76

187.00
215.00
238.80
263.60

116.82
138.82
149.42
140.01

187.00
215 .00

105.94
109.96

203.07

124.30

157. 11

92.72

3. 635**

3. 356*

**Indicate significance at the o< .01level.
*Indicate significance at the o< • 05 level.

~ould be significant at the o< .051 level.

-'I
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taken over a considerable period of time, it seemed appropriate that they
should be converted to real terms. The wholesale price index was used
for this purpose.
In order to account for the uncertainty found in the real world, a
conversion to expected deliveries per share and expected rental prices
was necessary. Several variations of two basic methods of obtaining
expected values were tested to determine which method gave the best
result. The methods tested were a simple moving average and an expectation:
model which assigns various weights to each observation in accordance with

its position in time with respect to the present. In the expectation model
the heaviest weight is given to the most recently observed values. A
"best model" was determined by observing the deviations of the expected
values from the observed. The method in which the sum of the squared
deviations from the observed data were least was considered the most
appropriate.
The results of these tests indicated that a five-year moving average
was the most consistent indicator of the observed water deliveries, and
rental prices were best approximated by incorporating a form of the
expectation model in which the expectation coefficient (

P ) was assumed

to be . 5.
Information obtained from the four major loan institutions in the
area indicated that since the early 1940' s, the major portion of loans
made for the purchase of water stock have carried an interest rate of
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about 5 percent per annum. For this reason, an interest rate of 5 percent
was used in capitalizing the annual rental price.
At the

o( • 05

level, a t test of the difference between the means

of the capitalized annual rental prices and the sale prices of a permanent
right which is expected to deliver the same quantity of water reveals that
all but one are significantly greater than zero, indicating that the means
of sale and capitalized rental prices are significantly different. Because
the means of the capitalized rental values are greater than the means of
the sale prices, there is evidence that the market for annual use rights
is somewhat more flexible than that for perpetual rights. It should be
noted that this does not suggest that impediments to flexi.bi.li.ty do not
exist in either case. It is simply implied that the degree of flexibility
in the rental market is apparently greater than that which exists in the
market for permanent rights.

DEVELOPMENT OF VARIABLES AND PROCEDURE

Hypothesis
The hypothesis to be tested is that changes in the institutions
which eliminate barriers to free transfer of a limited resource will
result in an increase in the economic benefits derived from that
resource. For the purposes of this study, the limited resource is the
irrigation water supply for the Delta area in Utah. The institutions of
con cern a re those community mores, irrigation company policies, and
state water right laws which may affect (facilitate or impede) transfer
of water between users. Because irrigation water is primarily an input
factor used in the production of agricultural crops, evidence of benefit
derived will be expressed in dollar terms as determined by an appropriate
indicator of the value of marginal product produced by irrigation water.
Changes in the Institutions to be Tested
A rather exhaustive persual of local policy and customs pertinent
to water transfer discloses one major change in policy which could be
expected to have a significant influence on water transfer in the area.
The change in question involves a policy gradually initiated between
1946 and 1950 which allowed the water of any one irrigation company to
be transferred into the systems of any of the other three companies in
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the area. This increased the effective market area for water by
about 400 percent and should have gone far to eliminate disparities
in the marginal productivities which may have existed between the
companies.
Because this change in transfer policy was not instantaneous but
required five years to become fully operable, it necessitated the comparison of rental price observations occurring in different time periods.
Also, by introducing a time difference, factors other than the change
in transfer policy could be expected to influence the rental price. Water
supply, prices of products and other inputs, teclmology and chan.ges in
the transfer conditions might all be expected to influence rental prices
over time. Even under comparatively stable conditions, the significance
attached to any differential which may occur between the two series of
rental prices is necessarily dependent upon how well the influences of
variables other than the change in transfer policy can be identified and
quantified.
Empirical Procedure
Of primary concern in the statistical analysis was the determination

of any significant difference between two series of irrigation water rental
prices,~

each series having been associated with a different transfer policy.

In order to accomplish this objective, it was necessary to test the signifi-

cance of variables which a priori might have influenced the rental price
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occurring over the two time periods.
Three statistical tools were used to provide this information.
The first was a multiple regression analysis. The second involved a
t test for significant differences between means of the same variable
associated with each of two time periods. Commonly this technique
is known as mean difference analysis. The third was a covariance
analysis. In all cases, these techniques were uti.li.zed to determine the
significance of various factors and to specify the degree of statistical
confidence which cruld be attached to certain relationships found in the
data.
Multiple regression analysis
Multiple regression is a teclmi.que which determines the effect of
several independent variables upon a single dependent variable. Various
tools have been devised to determine the absolute and relative importance
of the various independent variables which a priori. could have a significant
influence on the dependent variable. The general model used was as
follows:
Y = f (X 1,

x 2, x 3)

Where:
Y = the dependent (explai.ned)variabl~,

x 1, x 2, x 3: the relevant independent (explanatory) variables.
Significant independent variables were determined by testing the
significance of numerous sample statistics which provide estimates of the
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population parameters and by ranking them. Included among these were
the simple partial coefficients of correlation, the simple partial
coefficients of determination, the regress ion coefficients, and the standard
partial regress ion coefficients.
At test was used to determine whether the simple partial corre lation
coefficients were significantly different from zero (6). Sample partial
coefficients of determination were calculated and ranked in the order of
their apparent effect on the dependent variable. The significance of
regression coefficients for the various independent variables was determined
oy setting up the null hypothesis that/}= 0 and using at test.

Finally,

the standard partial regression coefficients were utilized to rank each
independent variable in relation to the others.
The results of these measures were used only as indicators of the
significance of each variable. When contradictory results were obtained, a
judgment had to be made on the basis of other criteria.

Among these were

the correlation coefficients for the model obtained from stepwise regression
and the presence or absence of apparently significant interaction among the
independent variables. If indicators consistently showed strong significance,
the variable was considered significant.
Va riables determined to be significant in the multiple regression
analysis were included in the mean difference and covariance analyses.
Mean difference analysis
Mean difference analysis is a group comparison technique based on
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students ' t test. At test of the difference between means is used for the
purpose of determining, within the laws of probability, if the difference
between calculated means may be attributed to differences in population
mean or to random variation (15).
In the mean difference analysis, t is calculated in the following

manner:

(x1 - x2) - (M 1 s x1 - x2

M 2)

Where:
M 1 and M 2 = the means of the respective populations and a re
assumed to be equal,

x1 and x2 = the

respective sample means of the same variable

occurring in the two separate groups,
S 5q and x2 = the standard error of the difference between the
two sample means and is analogous to the S x used
in a simple t test.
The null hypothesis relevant to this method of analysis is
HO: M1 - M2 = 0, for each variable to be tested. A significant difference
is indicated by a calculated t value which exceeds the tabular value at
some previously determined probability level with degrees of freedom
equal to the sum of the observation occurring in each group minus two.
Covariance analysis
Covariance analysis is essentially a combination of regression and
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analysis of variance. The technique is designed to eliminate the effect
of uncontrolled environmental conditions from treatment effects thus
increasing the precision of the estimate of variation due to treatments (3).
The dependent variable is regressed within each treatment on the
independent variable or variables, the influence of which is to be
eliminated from the treatment effects. Sample estimates of the regression
coefficients and variables for each regression within treatments are tested
to be certain that a covariance technique is applicable to the data. In
general, the regression coefficients within treatments should not be
significantly different from each other, and the variance about the regression
should not be significantly different betwe en treatments. Also if the
correlation coefficient is less than . 3, the possibility of increasing
precision with covariance is questionable.
In this analysis, rental price was the dependent variable and different
transfer policies were the treatments. Independent variables included were
those found significant in the multiple regression analysis.
Selection and Developm;g>,of Variables
An a priori selection of variables thought to be important in

accounting for the variation in water prices are: water supply available,
alfalfa seed prices , livestock prices, other inputs, and technology (16).
Each of these will be examined in detail within this section.
Table 10 contains data for the dependent variable and all independent
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Table 10. Data used

i.;1.

the statistical analysis
~

Year

Rental
Allocative price
policy
per
in effecta acre footb

Water
available
per
irrigated acre

Expected
Expected
alfalfa
livestock
seed price
price
per 100 lb. per 100 lb.
clean seed live weight

(dollars)

(acre feet)

(dollars)

(dollars)

1934
1935
1936
1937
1938

1
1
1
1
1

3. 49
5. 71
4.12
2.52
2.02

1. 298o
. 7420
1.0203
1. 9478
2.1 333

25.43
35.62
31.78
37.05
46.16

12.01
10.87
12.39
13. 11
13.95

1939
1940
1941

1

1
1

2. 37
2.91
2.55

1. 8551
1. 8551
2. 1333

43.88
42.66
37.94

14.15
15.43
16. 53

1950
1951
1952
1953
1954

2
2
2
2
2

3. 55
5.66
3. 95
2.70
6. 46

1. 81 68
1. 3938
2.2417
2. 2250
1. 3772

40.93
48.96
50. 07
40.01
31.43

24.12
26.19
29.15
28.54
23.29

1955
1956
1957
1958
1959

2
2
2
2
2

6.44
10.40
15.15
4.98
6. 96

1. 3951
. 9441
. 9715
1. 8475
1. 4131

36.47
27.65
29 . 76
28.23
25.00

20.38
18.45
16.72
17. 17
20.22

1960
1961
1962
1963
1964

2
2
2
2
2

15. 89
19.94
9.94
16.95
15.00

1. 0327
.8249
1. 4644
. 8809
1. 0454

25.80
24. 94
30.99
38.09
32.00

21.87
21.01
20. 65
20.06
20.46

a

A (1) indicates that only intracompany transfers were permitted. A (2)
indicates that intercompany transfers were permitted.

bRental prices have been adjusted to real terms by using the U.
Wholesale Price Index, 1957-59 base.
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variables which could be quantified and included in the statistical analysis.
Price of water
The dependent (explained) variable was the annual rental price of
water. In order to obtain a measure of the effie iency implications
associated with a change in transfer policy, it was necessary to find an
indicator of the value of the marginal product of irrigation water both
before and after this change occurred. Preferably it should be such that
differences occurring could be tested statistically. The water rental
market appeared to be sufficiently competitive to permit the rental price
per a cre foot to be used for this purpose.
Since 1950, one rental price per ac r e foot has prevailed in all of
the companies during any given irrigation season. Prior to that time
reliable price data were available for only one of the four companies.
Because of this limitation, it was necessary to assume that the companies
did not vary greatly and that the data obtained from this company was typical
of conditions found in the other companies. This did not appear to be an
especially heroic assumption because this company has the largest irrigated
acreage and the rental market for water has been more active in it than
in any of the other companies. Besides, water use and agriculture under
this system are not dissimilar from those of the other companies in the
area. If bias enters the analysis because of this extrapolation, it is
most certainly on the side of conservatism. Ceteris paribus, the relatively
large .irrigated acreage and active rental market within this company would
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cause it to be affected by a lesser amount with the introduction of a free
transfer policy than would the other companies where the market area
was smaller and the rental market was not so completely developed.
From these

dat~,

two series of rental prices were selected to

approximate the value of the marginal product associated with each of
the two institutional arrangements. These price observations were drawn
from the years prior to and immediately following the transition to a
relatively free transfer policy.
The length of these two series was limited by a number of factors.
Among these were the availability of reliable data, governmental activity
in the water market, and the depressed economic conditions occurring
prior to 1934. Although data were available before 1934, forced sales of
water stock and generally chaotic financial adjustments occurring within
the area and irrigation companies suggest that rental prices may not have
been reliable indicators of value of marginal product during this period.
The period 1934 through 1941 was relatively stable in this water
market. The debts of the irrigation companies and drainage districts had
been readjusted and placed on a sound basis of refinancing, the amount of
irrigated land remained virtually constant and prices and general economic
conditions were somewhat more stable (23) .
1n 1942, the government began purchasing water stock at a price

somewhat above the market price in order to obtain a water supply for
the Topaz War Relocation Project that was to be constructed in the area.
Approximately 20, 000 shares of stock, enough to irrigate 8, 000 to 10,000
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acres, were purchased between 1942 and 1947 after which time it was
resold to the farmers in the area . This action by the government had the
affect of curtailing the rental market to such extent that few rentals
occurred and virtually no rental price data were available for the years
1942 through 1947. This, plus the typical wartime distortion of prices and
market conditions prompted the exclusion of this period from the earlier
series. Thus the rental prices occurring during the series of years from
1934 through 1941 were used to approximate the value of the marginal
product derived from water under the allocative policy which limited
transfers to the extent of each individual company's canal system.
Since 1950, there have been relatively few data problems. Consequently, it was possible to include all of the rental prices occurring in the
series of years from 1950 through 1964 in the later group. This group
represents the rental price associated with a relatively free transfer
policy in which the water of any company could be transferred into the system
of any other company.
Rental prices for the earlier period were obtained from data compiled for an earlier research effort by Dudley Crafts, a prominent lawyer
and water authority who resides in the area. These rental prices were
taken from records of the rental of rather large blocks of nonfarmerowned stock. During this period of time approximately 25 percent of the
active shares of this company were held by persons and agencies other
than farmers and were rented regularly. Because there was no apparent
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reason for nonfarm owners of water s tock t o react differently than farm
owners , one could expect the r ental price t o be a very good approximation
of the value of the marginal product derived from the last unit of water used.
The prevailing conditions which existed in the water market area
and the suitability of the rental price in approximating the return from the
use of water as described in the Wartime Water Facilities Plan as
follows:
This condition of buyers and sellers dealing to effect
the renting of approximately a ll of the available stock
year after year has presented a fairly open market where
supply and demand have been prime factors in determining
the prices paid.
Special significance attaches to the prices paid by
farmers for the r ental of water stock. In general these
rentals seem to indicate t he a mount that farmers are
willing to pay for the us e of t he wat er and this price is
no doubt based largely on t he estimated value of the water
to the farmer in terms of crop production. (23, p. 24)
Rental prices for the later period were obtai ned from a rental
reeord of the water r epresented by 385 shares of company A stock. This
estimate of the market rental price is more accurate than the size of the
sample would indicate because it is customary to wait until the market
price is well established before offering company water for rent.
Because these two series of price data covered a rather long
period of time in which there were sharp changes in the aggregate price
level, it was nee essary to deflate them so that they would be comparable
in terms of purchasing power. The wholesale price index for all
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commodities was used for this purpose (21).
Water available
It seems logical to assume that the rental price of water will be

greatly affected by changes in the quantity of water available. Ceteris
paribus, a reduction in the supply of water will cause the market price
to increase. When water is in short supply, it will be used only in more
valuable uses, thus the value of the marginal product should rise. For
this reason a careful evaluation of the water supply was deemed a prerequisite to subsequent comparison of rental prices since this variable
might explain much of the variation in the marginal value products of
water in the two periods. If so, one would be less confident about drawing
conclusions concerning the effect of changes in transfer regulations .
Despite rather extensive storage facilities, the irrigation water
supply for the Delta area remains quite volatile. As a result, any attempt
to estimate the expected delivery for any year or period of years in the
future is greatly complicated. However, when working with the rental
price, this area of uncertainty is largely circumvented. After April 1 of
any given season, the water credits available have been determined, making
it possible to plan with a minimum of uncertainty. In most rental transactions, the farmer bargains for a specified quantity of water and not some
expected quantity. For this reason the aggregate water credit available to
the farmers at their headgates was deemed the most appropriate supply
variable to include in this analysis.
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Because the price data for the early period were representative
of just one company, and that of the later period were for the aggregate of
companies, the supply figure or water available for any given season had
to be reduced by a common denominator in order to facilitate any meaningful comparison. Due to the nature of water use in this area, the -most
appropriate common denominator for water available appeared to be the
number of irrigable acres to which this supply could be applied. Appropriate
acreage figures were obtained from the Millard County Assessor's Office.
Thus the variable representing supply was reduced to water available per
irrigated acre as shown in column 4 of Table 10.
Expected price of products
The price which a farmer will pay for a unit of water is dependent
in part upon the price he expects to receive from his crops. A farmer should
be willing t o apply an input factor up to that point where the marginal factor
cost equals the value of the marginal product. The value of the marginal
product is a function of the product price. As the expected product price
rises a farmer will find it profitable to employ more of the factor of
production. Therefore high product prices are consistent with greater
quantities of factors employed. The inverse is also true. A decrease
in product prices will cause the value of the marginal product to fall,
thus the farmer will be able to employ the same quantity as formerly
only at a lower factor price . Therefore low product prices are consistent
with lesser quantities of the factor employed.
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Because alfalfa seed and livestock products are the major
sources of income for the area (20), the expected price of alfalfa seed
and a measure of the expected price for livestock were included as
variables in this analysis as indicators of the effect of product prices
upon the rental price of water.
Alfalfa seed prices. In the census years 1939, 1944, 1949, 1954,
and 1959, the alfalfa seed crop accounted for an average of 61 percent of
the value of all field crops sold in Millard County (22). The Delta area
comprises about 75 percent of the irrigated acreage in Millard County and
specialization in alfalfa seed production i.s even more intense there than
in the remainder of the county. Irrigation company officials estimate that
80 to 90 percent of the irrigated acreage in the area is planted to alfalfa.
This can be attributed to the scarcity of water and to the predominance of
heavy clay soils which tend to favor the alfalfa crop .
Because alfalfa seed produced in the Delta area represents about
60 percent of the total production of the state, prices for the state were
cons idered a good approximation of this variable for the study a rea. The
price of alfalfa seed i.s set nationwide and the supply produced by the
state of Utah is a very small part of the total national supply. Therefore,
what happens in the area of alfalfa seed production has little to do with
the state or national price. Basic data used in calculating the expected
alfalfa seed prices used in the analysis were obtained from data released
by the Statistical Reportin g Service.
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Livestock prices.

In census years since 1939, sale of live-

stock and livestock products have accounted for an average of 59 percent
of the value of all farm products sold in Millard County. In the same
years, sale of cattle and calves accounted for an average of 59 percent
of the value of livestock and livestock products sold (22). Because of the
relative importance of cattle and calves in the livestock group, the expected
price variable for this analysis was based on a weighted average of cattle
and calf prices. 2
On a priori grounds, the livestock price may not appear to have

been an appropriate variable because livestock are a rather indirect product of irrigation water. However, census data for Millard County indicate
that a rather large amount of alfalfa hay is grown, w'ith only a small
percentage being marketed directly. This indicates that a substantial
portion of the hay was marketed through livestock. If the expected price
of livestock were relatively high, more water could be demanded for the
production of hay.
The expected livestock price thus may have an affect on the rental
price of water. Basic price data on cattle and calves were obtained from
livestock price data recently made available by the Statistical Reporting
Service .
2Livestock price was determined by calculating a weighted average
of cattle and calf prices. Weights were determined by calculating the
percentage each of these contributed to the total value of cattle and calves
sold.
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Refinements of both alfalfa seed and livestock price data included
an adjustment to a common price index and the determination of an expected
price for each year. As in the case of the rental price variable, the wholesale price index was used to convert the prices to real terms.
In this analysis, expected prices were deemed more appropriate than

observed prices for explaining the actions of farm operators. During any
given season, the decisions a farmer makes are based on what he expects
will happen. It seems reasonable to assume that what a farmer expects in
the future is some function of phenomena he has observed in the past. In the
static model. or in the case of an administered price which is fixed, future
price expectations would be exactly equal to the most recently observed past
price . Under these conditions the expected price is a function of the last
previous price giving 100 percent of the weight to that value. Variables
other than previous prices could be evaluated but they would not contribute
to the analysis under these circumstances.
Most commodity prices, including those of alfalfa seed and livestock, are somewhat volatile. Under these circumstances it seems reasonable to assume that future price expectations will include a considerable
number of past observations of the same variable. P robably the leas t
complicated method of calculating an expected price using one variable is a
simple average of previous prices. This gives equal weight to each
observation included in the average. In the absence of a trend or
oscillations which are of a uniform or predictable nature this would appear
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to be the most appropriate tool. However, an expectation model which
utilizes a weighted average of past observed prices, giving the highest
weights to the most recent observations, might generate more realistic
price expectations.
A widely used model of this type was used in calculating the
expected prices to be used in this analysis. It utilizes only one variable,
past prices, and attaches decreas ing we ights to each price observation as
determined by its relative position in time with respect to the present.
This particular function used in this study is as follows :
p e=

fJ Pt -.
••• +

(1 - /3 ) /1 Pt - 1 + (1 - 13 )2 /1 Pt - 2 ,.

(1 - (3 )n - 1 /3 Pt - (n - 1)

Where:
P: the observed price for alfalfa seed,
P e= the expected value of P ,
Pt, Pt _ 1 , . • . Pt -(n _ 1 ) : the observed values of P for n
time periods beginning with Pt _ ¢1-

1:

and extending forward to the current
period t,
(1 -/3),

(1 -/3 )2 , . . • (1 -/.l )n- 1 " the weights to be applied
to the P's observed in the
periods t back to t - (n- 1).

·It was assumed that

/i = . 5. A coefficient of this size weights the

most recently observed price just equal to the proportion of the total weight
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assigned to all other observations. Under this assumption, 99.9
percent of the total weight attached to the expected price is accounted
for in ten years or from t - 9 through t time periods.
These expected prices for alfalfa seed and livestock are listed in
Table 10 together with water available per irrigated acre and the annual
rental price per acre foot (real terms).
Other inputs
The quantities of other inputs used in conjunction with water could
also be expected to have some effect upon the rental price of water. If
quantities of other factors used jointly with water are increased, the marginal
physical product of water is driven up as is the value of the marginal product.
Foremost among these other inputs is land.
Land.

Although the amount of water applied per acre is variable,

in an arid region where some irrigation water is absolutely essential for
production, there is some minimum level of supply per acre where water
and land may become technical complements. Given these conditions, it
seems logical to assume that substantial changes in the acreage to be
irrigated without a corresponding change in the water supply would have a
considerable affect on the rental price of water. Given a fixed water supply,
an expansion in irrigated acreage should drive up the value of the marginal
prod! ct of water.
Data found in the Water Facilities Plan (23) indicates that between
1934 and 1941 the irrigated acreage in the study area was relatively
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constant at 39, 700 acres. These data were taken from the Millard
County Assessor's records. In all of Millard County, land in farms
irrigated was 72, 897 in 1939 and 77, 140 in 1944 (22).
In the later period, 1950 through 19 64, the number of acres

irrigated in the study area also appears to have been quite constant.
Data from the Soil Conservation Service indicated an irrigated acreage of
51, 306.9 in 1959. Assessment roles list 51, 020.0 acres as of the end of
1964. For all of Millard County, land in farms irrigated in census years
was 77, 740 acres in 1949, 81, 919 acres in 1954, and 75, 793 in 1959 (22).
The figures for Millard County would necessarily show more
fluctuation than the study area because Millard County data includes one
rather large high water irrigation company.

For the most part this

company has rights of low priority and very little water is available
for it until the rights of the four companies in the study area are filled.
Because the irrigated acreage tended to be constant within each
time period, it was possible to exclude variation in irrigated acreage as a
variable affecting rental price.
Technology
New technology could be expected to affect the price of water.
The introduction of a technological advance, such as hybrid corn, may
generate a new production function such that a greater output of product
is obtained with the same expenditure of resources. This would have the
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affect of shifting the value of the marginal product curve to the right,
thus increasing the demand for water. Under these circumstances,
either more water will enter the market or a higher price will be paid
for the former quantity depending whether or not the supply to the area
is fixed.

Since 1940, several supposed improvements in technology have
been introduced which may have had some affect on the rental price of
water.

Among these are commercial fertilizers, insecticides, mechani-

zation, and new crop varieties.

For the most part, technological develop-

ment is output increasing and should be reflected in increased crop yields
per acre. Assuming that the study area is not substantially different from
the state and that alfalfa seed yields can be used as an indicator of the
effect of new technology, there is little evidence that any of these were
effectual either singly or collectively. The average yield of clean alfalfa
seed per acre in the state was 155.38 pounds for 21 years prior to 1940,
and 153.53 pounds for the last 25 years.
A closer examination of certain unique features of the study area
may help to explain why possible technological improvements were rather
ineffectual. Foremost among these is the fact that soil and water limitations
have resulted in a virtual one crop economy, that being alfalfa.
New varieties . Although several new varieties of alfalfa have
been developed, it is extremely doubtful that any variety was introduced
because of its higher seed yields. Increased tonnage should be a positive
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factor; however, the impact would be quite slow in becoming apparent
because a lfalfa stands are not changed readily. The usual duration of
a stand is from 5 to as much as 20 years.
Fertilizer.

Soil studies conducted in the area in 1919 indicated

that no commercial fertilizer and very little manure were used in the area
at that time (17). A later study indicates that the soils of the area contain
ample quantities of all fertilizer elements but nitrogen (12). The first
record of fertilizer use in the census (22) came in 1954 when 1, 331 tons
were used on 9, 077 acres in a ll of Millard County. By 1959, this amount
had decreased to 888 tons used on 5, 193 acres. If it is assumed that a ll
of the fertilizer were us ed on irrigated lands, only 11.1 percent of the
irrigated acreage in Millard County received some fertilizer in 1954, and
6. 8 percent in 1959 . During these same years the water supply for the
study area was virtually constant with 70, 266.8 ac re feet available in
1954 and 72, 09 6 available in 1959 . Judging from this data it would
appear that fertilizer application is independent of water supply and the
quantity used has decreased between two years when other inputs (land
and water) remained quite constant. In a ddition, 80 to 90 percent of the
area is planted to alfalfa, a nitrogen fixing crop, which has little need for
fertilizer on the relatively new soils found in the Delta area. Under these
circumstances it is possible that farm ers realize little or no response
from the use of fertil izer except on crops other than alfalfa. Because
crops other than alfalfa make up such a small portion of the total of crops
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produced, there is little reason to believe that fertilizer has a substantial affect on the value of the marginal product of water and thus
on water rental prices.
Mechanization. Although new mechanical tools have been
introduced, there is no evidence available which would indicate that they
have affected yields. The total labor input per acre may even be less
because of the more extensive methods usually associated with large
scale operations. Also, it seems highly improbable that machinery serves
in any was as a substitute for water. Therefore, it was concluded that the
effect of increased mechanization on the rental price of water was negligible.
Insecticides.

The introduction of insecticides should have had a

positive affect on alfalfa seed yields. However, some farmers in the area
indicate that careless use of chemicals may have reduced the number of
pollinators to the extent that seed yields were decreased. It is not likely
that this is a trend which will persist. If insecticides have resulted in
increased alfalfa seed yields, these increases have been more than
absorbed by other negative factors. On this basis it was concluded that
the introduction of insecticides did not affect the value of the marginal
product of water during the period of time included in this analysis .

ANALYSIS AND RESULT
This s ection includes a listing of the analysis and results obtained
from the multiple regression, mean difference, and covariance analyses.
Multiple Regression
In the regression model let:

Y = average annual rental price per acre foot (dollars),
Xp water available annually per irrigated acre (acre feet),

x 2 " expected price of alfalfa seed per hundred weight (dollars),
x 3 = expected price of livestock per hundred weight (dollars).
Scatter diagrams of the relationship between the dependent variable
(Y) and each independent variable (X 1,

x 2, x 3 ) are presented in Figures 4

through 6.
Results of the regression equation were as follows:
X= 16.052622- 7.8872741Xl- .13344741X2 - .40234719X3
(. 053165356)
(148.3536)

(. 75555729)
(.17662)

(. 12533946)
(3. 21006)

Values in parentheses under the regression coefficient are the
standard errors (Sb) and calculated t values for each coefficient, Twentythree sets of annual observations for Y, X1, X2, a nd

x 3 were

included in

the analysis . Using three independent variables and one dependent variable

98

Water rental
price per
acre foot

•

20.00

•
15.00

•
••

10.00

•

•

•

5.00

•

.5

1.0

•••
•
•
1.5

•
•

:.

' .•

2.0

2.5

Water available per irrigated acre

Figure 4. Scatter diagram for water rental price per acre foot and water
available per irrigated acre.
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Figure 5. Scatter diagram of water rental price per acre foot and
expected price of alfalfa seed per hundred pounds.
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left 19 degrees of freedom (n - 4). With 19 degrees of freedom,
calculated values of t greater than 2. 093 at the 5 percent level and
greater than 2. 861 at the 1 percent level differ significantly from zero.
Determination of significant variables
Simple partial correlation coefficients, simple partial coefficients
of determination, standard partial regression coefficients as well as the
partial regression coefficients were obtained from the multiple regression
analysis. Simple partial correlation coefficients between water rental
price and each independent variable as well as the partial regression
coefficients were subjected to at test to see if they differed significantly
from zero. Simple partial coefficients of determination were ranked in
the order of their apparent influence on the water rental price variable.
Also, the standard partial regression coefficients for each independent
variable were ranked, each in relation to the others .
The results of these tests for significance and rank of importance
for each independent variable are presented in Table 11. Independent
variables chosen for further analysis were determined by evaluating the
results shown in this table.
Water available per irrigated acre.

A test of the partial

regression coefficient for this variable was highly significant. The standard
partial regression coefficient was ranked number one and was nearly twice
as great as that of either of the other variables. The simple partial

102
Table 11 . Measures of significa nce an d r ank f or ea ch independent
variable

Independent
variable

P a rtial
regression
coefficient

Standar d
partial
r egr es sion
c oe fficient

Coefficient
of
correlation

Coefficient
of
determination

Water available
per irrigated
acre

xl
Expected price
of alfalfa
seed/ cwt.
x2

- 7.887274la

-. 7030 (l)b

-.7374482la

54.383% (l)b

- .1 33 44741

- . 1881 (3)

- .51958773

26.997% (2)

. 40234719

• 3766 (2)

. 18203542

3. 314% (3)

Expect ed price
of livestock
per cwt.

x3

aCalculated t values differed significantly from zero at both the o< • 05
and the <><::: • 01 probability leve ls.
bThe number in parentheses is the rank or order number.
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coefficient of correlation was significantly different from zero at the
o<

• 01 level.

The simple partial coefficient of determination also ranked

first in importance at 54.383 percent.
In comparison, this variable was rated first in importance by

all four criteria. On this basis, it was concluded that water available
per irrigated acre was a significant variable and that it should be included
in any subsequent analyses.
Expected price of alfalfa seed.

The partial regression coefficient

for this variable was not significantly different from zero even at o< • 50
level. The standard partial regression coefficient was of least importance.
The simple partial coefficient of correlation was not significantly different
from zero at the . 05 level; however, the simple partial coefficient of
determination was second in importance at 26.997 percent.
Thus, three of the four criteria indicated that this variable was
of very little importance in the model. The fourth indicated that 26. 997
percent of the variability in water rental price was explained by this
variable when other independent variables were held constant at their
means.
This apparent inconsistency may be explained by the presence of
a significant interaction between this variable and the variable representing
water available . The sign of this interaction is positive indicating that
increases in the water available per acre accompany increases in expected
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alfalfa seed prices or vice versa. Because there appears to have been
no logical basis for this relationship, it must have been spurious correlation
and can be attributed only to chance.
Since three of the four criteria indicated that this variable was
of little importance in the model, it was concluded that it could be
eliminated from subsequent statistical analyses.
Expected price of livestock.

At test of the partial regression

coefficient for this variable was highly significant. The standard partial
regression coefficient was second in importance, about one-half the
magnitude of the variable of highest rank. The simple partial regression
coefficient was nonsignificant at the o< .05 level and the simple partial
coefficient of determination was the least of any variable at 3. 314 percent.
In the previous section it was noted that this variable was included
on rather questionable a priori. grounds because of its indirect relationship
with irrigation water. Of the four criteria used to determine significance,
only one ranked this variable as significant. Under these circumstances,
it was considered a bit presumptuous to include the variable in subsequent
analyses unless all criteria indicated that it was significant. For these
reasons the expected price of livestock was excluded from further analyses.
Additional test of the two variables not significant
After i.t was determined that water available per irrigated acre
was the only independent variable significantly affecting the rental price
variable, a new regression model was formulated using only water

105
available per irrigated acre as the independent variable. Expected prices
of alfalfa seed and livestock were not included. This facilitated a comparison of the multiple coefficient of determination (R 2 ) for the two
models, one including all independent variables, the other including only
significant variables. If the multiple coefficient of determination was not
reduced significantly by removal of these variables, it would indicate that
little explanatory power would be lost by leaving them out of the analysis.
The exclusion of these two independent variables resulted in an 11 percent
decrease in the multiple coefficient of determination. This indicated that
the explanatory value of the model was not greatly reduced by the removal
of nonsignificant variables.
In observing the scatter diagram of rental price per acre foot

and water available per irrigated acre as presented in Figure 4, there
was some indication that a curvilinear model would give a better fit of
the data. This did not seem to be true with the price of livestock and
price of alfalfa seed variables. Rental price and water supply variables
were therefore converted to logarithms and the computations made again.
2

In this analysis the coefficient of determination (R ) for the model was

increased by 5. 24 percent. Although the fit was slightly better, it seems
doubtful that it was enough better to justify complicating the interpretation
of the result. If a curvilinear model were used, it would be very difficult
to test the assumptions pertinent to the covariance technique which was to be
used later in the analysis. Thus, the linear model was retained.
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Mean Difference Analysis
The rental price variable and the water available variable
were subjected to a mean difference analysis. The purpose of this test
was to determine if mean difference for these variables differed
significantly from zero under the two a llocative arrangements considered
in this study. The rental price of water per acre foot and water available
per irrigated acre were tested in this manner.
Interpretation of the results of
the mean difference analysis
The mean annual rental price for these years when intercompany
transfers were not permitted was $3.21 per acre foot. During the later
period under more liberal transfer arrangements the mean annual rental
price was $9. 60 per acre foot. The means of water available were found
to be 1. 61 and 1. 39 acre feet respectively for the same time periods.
Mean differences for rental price and water available were found to be $6. 39
and . 23 acre feet respectively.
Calculated values of t used for testing the significance of the
mean differences associated with each of these variables are shown in
Table 12.
The mean difference of water supply did not differ significantly
from zero even at the o< . 20 level. However, the mean difference for
rental price was highly significant.
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Table 12. "t" values for mean difference analysis of water available
per irrigated acre, and rental price of water

Variable tested

t value

Water available

1. 084287a

Rental price

4.224*

aNot significant at oC. .05 level.
*Significant at ot: . 01 level.

When the mean values of the water supply are not significantly
different between time periods, it is an indication that the average affect
upon the rental price variable was essentially the same in both time
periods. Assuming that thi.s variable explains a major part of the variability
in rental price, the significant difference occurring between the means of
the rental price variable can then be attributed to the change in transfer
policy. 3
Covariance Analysis
The ultimate purpose of the covariance analysis is to obtain mean
3within each of the two separate groups of rental prices for the
years 1934-1941 and 1950-1964, a linear regression of water supply on
rental price indicated that 90 percent and 75 percent of the variability in
rental price was accounted by changes in the water supply. Thus it
would appear that variables other than those evaluated here have little
affect on the rental price.
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values for the dependent variable which have been adjusted for the variation
attributed to the independent variable. There were two treatments or
groups in the analysis, each corresponding to a period of time in which a
particular transfer policy was in effect. Water rental prices per acre foot
were regressed within each treatment against water available per irrigated
acre. Thus two separate regression lines were fitted to the data, each
one reflecting the relationship between the water rental price per acre
foot and water available per irrigated acre within each treatment.
Before proceeding further, measures obtained from these regressions
were utilized to test certain assumptions pertinent to the covariance
analysis. In covariance analysis, it is assumed that all samples within
treatments are drawn from normal populations with common variances, and
that the slopes of the regressions are the same or not significantly different
between treatments. Estimates of the variances about the regression lines
and the respective regression coefficients were subjected to an F test to
establish whether or not they differed significantly. Should the result of
these tests of the sample statistics fail to coincide with the assumptions
pertinent to covariance, it would necessitate the use of an approximate
test.
Techniques used in the approximate test vary depending upon which
assumptions are violated. When the residual variances between treatments
are found to differ significantly, the usual tests are employed, however,
the number of degrees of freedom used in testing is ordinarily reduced.
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Should both assumptions be violated, the approximate test becomes
somewhat more complicated. Instead of adjusting the treatment regressions
along a common regression,all treatment regressions are adjusted along
their respective slopes or planes to a predetermined value for the
independent variable. The significance of differences due to treatment
for predicted values of the dependent variable can then be tested at that
level of the independent variable. In this test the number of degrees of
freedom is again reduced because it is an approximation.
Preliminary tests of the regression coefficients and residual
variances indicated that both are significantly different between treatments.
Although the technique is not usually invalidated by failure to meet the
assumptions, results obtained from any subsequent analysis would be
suspect and should be regarded as approximate rather than exact (3, p. 83).
In order to minimize the effect of this discrepency on subsequent
measures , a conservative approximate test was used. Instead of adjusting
treatment regressions along a common regression, they were adjusted in
terms of their respective slopes and compared at a given level of water
available. Degrees of freedom used in testing the significance of
differences between predicted rental prices at given levels of water available
were reduced from 21 to 7.
Result of the covariance analysis
When water available was assumed to be equal to the 23 year average
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of water available per irrigated acre, at test of the difference in
predicted rental prices between treatments was highly significant. At
probability level . 01 with seven degrees of freedom tabular t is 3. 499.
The calculated t value was 136.919. Results of this magnitude dispell any
doubt that the rental prices do not vary with transfer policy.
At the assumed level of water available, predicted rental prices
for the treatments we re $8. 75 and $3.54 per acre foot. This indicated
that a price differential of $5. 21 could be attributed to variations in the
transfer ar r angements.
Determination of allocative efficiency
In both the mean difference and covariance analyses, it was
determined that a significant differential existed between the rental price
occurring under different transfer policies. Special significance attaches
to this differential when it is recalled that the market price of a commodity
is a good approximation of t he value of the marginal product derived from
its use.

An examination of this differential should provide information

concerning the relative efficiency of the tw o allocative policies in question .
A dollar measure of the annual gain or loss associated with alternativ€
allocative policies was obtained by multiplying the differential in the per
acre foot rental prices by the average number of acre feet available at the
farm.

A ce rtain amount of error may enter this calculation because of an

inability to predict futur e water deliveries. However, the mean quantity

- - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

111

available at the farm should be a reasonable approximation where a
rather large number of years are involved, if it can be assumed that
variations in precipitation and other weather conditions which may affect
supply are completely random in occurrence over time.
The product of the differential in rental price and average water
available per season should be considered as an annual flow for as long
as a particular allocative policy i.s in affect. The present value of this
flow over any future period of time can be calculated by incorporating the
following capitalization equation.
PV:

~
l

(1 - ( + i.tn)

Where:
PV: the present value of the annual flow of gain or loss associated

with a given allocati.ve policy over some future period of time,
da: the annual differential in rental prices multiplied by the average
quantity of water available at the farm,
i : the interest rate,
n ~ the number of years into the future over which the present
value of the flow is being estimated.
It should be noted that if n is allowed to go to infinity, the equation

shown above simplifies to:

da

PV:i
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Results of this calculation using both measures of the differentia l
in rental prices and at various interest rates are shown in Table 13.
The capitalized value of the differential in rental prices is a
measure of the increase in value of t he limited water resource. Because
this increase in value was associated with the initiation of a new allocative
policy, i.t can be said that this new policy was more efficient than the
former arrangement.

Table 13. Pres ent value (dollars ) of the gain or loss associated wi.th a lternative allocative policies for
the aver age quantity of water ava ilable for irrigation in the Delta area, Utah

Source
of the
measure

Average
annual
value
(dollars )a

Mean
difference 453, 690
analysis
(6. 39)

Covariance
analysisb 369,910
(5.21)

Expected
du ration
of the
policy
i.n years

4

6

Interest rate
8

10

12

10
20
30
40
50

3, 679, 886
6, 165, 659
7, 845, 222
8, 979, 903
9, 746, 187
11,342,272

3, 339, 164
5,203,834
6, 245,055
6, 826, 233
7' 151, 075
7, 561, 514

3, 044,265
4, 454, 337
5, 107, 652
5, 410, 263
5, 550, 454
5, 671, 13 6

2, 787,930
3, 862, 724
4, 276, 944
4, 436, 643
4, 498,345
4, 53 6, 908

2, 563,
3, 388,
3, 654,
3, 740,
3, 767,
3, 780,

10
20
30
40
50

3,000,345
5, 027, 086
6,396,496
7, 321, 643
7, 946, 422
9, 247, 768

2,722, 542
4,242,876
5, 091, 821
5, 565, 676
5,830,532
6, 165, 178

2,482,101
3, 631, 783
4, 164, 455
4, 411, 185
4, 525, 487
4, 623, 884

2, 273, 101
3,149,419
3, 437, 148
3, 617, 357
3, 667, 664
3, 699 , 107

2, 089, 995
2, 762, 863
2, 979, 630
3,049,544
3,071, 738
3,082, 589

=

0.0

353
617
480
227
449
757

a Average water available at the farm per season (70, 000 . 14) multiplied by the differential i.n rental
price of water per acre foot.
bEstimate derived from the approximate test.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Statement of the Problem
Wate r is among the most vital of a ll resources. Increased demand
has resulted in a high degree of competition to secure the rights to water

both among and within uses.
In order to attain the maximum social productivity, allocation
should be such that the value of the marginal social product of water is
equal in all uses. Because of the dynam ic nature of the us es for water,
the maximum productivity can be achieved only if the resource can be
fr eely moved from places and uses of lower ma r ginal value to higher
ones.
This study was concerned with value of rights to water, transfer
of rights in the water market, and restrictive influences as they affect the
optimum a llocation of irrigation water.
Prima ry Objective and Procedure
The prima ry objective of this study was to determine the relative
efficiency of different allocative schemes for irrigation water. Alternatives
considered in this analysis included a comparison of two market situations,
one in which only intracompany transfers were permitted, and a second
in which intercompany transfers were allowed.
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Efficiency of allocation was determined by comparing indicators
of the value of the marginal product associated with the two allocative
arrangements. A rather long history of water market activity in the
study area made it possible to use the annual rental price of water as the
indicator of the value of the marginal product of water.

Formal records

indicated that very active markets have been in existence for more than
30 years. Ceteris paribus, the higher the value of the marginal product
(rental price) the greater the efficiency of allocation.
Because this comparison of value of the marginal products (rental
prices) was made over a considerable period of time, other variables
besides the change in transfer policy which could be expected to influence
the rental price of water were also considered. Included in this group of
variables were water available, product prices, other inputs, and
technology . Each of these variables was evaluated to determine its
relative importance and what influence, if a.11y, it had on the rental price
of water. Those found significant were included in subsequent statistical
comparisons of rental prices.
Results
The water available per irrigated acre was determined to be a.
significant explanatory variable. It was then possible to account for this
s ignificant relationship in establishing the "true" effect of the two transfer
policies on rental prices.
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Mean difference analysis
The average rental price under the policy which permitted
intercompany transfer of water was $9. 60 per acre foot.

The average

rental price under the more restrictive policy in which only intracompany
transfers were permitted was $3 . 21 per acre foot.

A mean difference

of $6. 39 was significantly different from zero at the c< . 01 level, indicating
that the average rental price was significantly higher under the free transfer
policy.
The means of water available per irrigated acre during the same
periods of time were 1. 39 and 1. 62 acre feet respectively. The mean
difference of . 23 acre feet was not significantly different between the
different allocative arrangements . This indicated that any difference in
the means of this variable between periods could be attributed only to
chance.
Covariance approximation
Predicted values of the rental price at 1. 47 acre feet per irrigated
acre were $8. 75 and $3. 54 per acre foot respectively. The higher rental
value was again associated with that policy which permitted intercompany
transfers.

A difference of $5.21 between predicted rental values at the

average level of water available was significantly different from zero at
the o< . 01 level.
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Conclusions
Statistically significant differences between the mean values
and also the predicted values of the rental price under different a llocative
policies provides strong evidence that transfer policies influence the
efficiency of allocation. In both tests the indicator of the value of the
marginal product of water was higher under the transfer policy which was
most flexible and permitted intercompany transfers. Using the most conservative estimate of difference in water value, it was determined that the
value of the water was increased by 147 percent by permitting greater
flexibility between users. It was concluded that an allocative policy
which permits intercompany transfers was more efficient than a policy
which allows only intracompany transfers.
In view of the recent clamor for more authoritative methods of

allocating water, this introduction of intercompany transfer in the study
area represents a bold step in the opposite direction. The ingenuity and
resolve displayed by these farmers in implementing this allocative
policy is remarkable, and the study clearly indicates the large efficiency
gains to the individual irrigator and to the agricultural community that
have resulted from this market development.
Suggestions for Further Research
This study alludes to more questions than were answered within the
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limited scope of this thesis. Several problems which received only
superficial treatment here would be interesting subjects for further
research. A brief list of these includes:
1. A more complete analysis of the effects of the "basis of

exchange" used in intercompany transfer.
2. A more complete appraisal of the apparent differences in
flexibility between the sale and rental markets for water.
3.

A comparison of the value of land, both with and without a

water supply.
The results of this analysis are conclusive and the implication for
similar areas is obvious. However, because the study area was unique
in many respects, further research should be conducted in other areas
where conditions are not so conducive to the development of a water
market. Particular emphasis should be placed on the feasibility of
determining spillover gains and losses which might result from a free
transfer policy.
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